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1990 OIL, GAS & MINERAL LAW
by
Stuart C. Hoiimon*
I. ISSUES INVOLVING CONVEYANCING
D Y & Co., Inc. v. Texiand Petroleum, Ina 1 involved a declaratory
judgment action brought by Day & Company and Bobby Day
against Texland to determine the ownership of the executive rights2
covering a ten-acre tract of land. Mildred Keaton and Francell Young, fee
simple owners of an eighty-acre tract of land, conveyed the land by warranty
deed to Day & Company. The deed reserved to Keaton and Young an undi-
vided one-half mineral interest in the land, but it expressly conveyed the
entire executive right in the entire tract to Day & Company. Day & Com-
pany later conveyed to John and Genelda Shoaf, by warranty deed, ten acres
out of the eighty-acre tract, excepting and reserving an additional undivided
one-fourth mineral interest. The warranty deed from Day & Company to
Shoaf was silent with regard to the executive rights. Day & Company then
executed a mineral lease on the entire eighty-acre tract to John Stringer.
The Shoafs also executed a mineral lease on their ten-acre tract to Stringer.
He later assigned both leases to Texland. Before Stringer's assignment to
Texland, Day & Company executed another mineral lease on the eighty-acre
tract to Bobby Day, contending that the lease to Stringer had expired due to
nonpayment of delay rentals.
Both Day & Company and Bobby Day claimed that they owned an undi-
vided three-fourths interest in the executive right regarding the ten-acre tract
and that the Shoafs owned the remaining one-quarter interest in such right.
Texland, on the other hand, contended that Day & Company owned only a
one-quarter undivided interest in the executive right, with the Shoafs owning
the other three-quarters interest. The trial court entered summary judgment
for Texland. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that executive rights
were "so significantly and intimately connected with the mineral estate as to
be within the general rule that a warranty deed passes all the estate owned
by the grantor at the time of the conveyance unless there are reservations or
* B.A., St. Olaf College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Stras-
burger & Price, Dallas, Texas.
1. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 549 (July 12, 1989). After this material had been submitted to the
publisher, the Texas Supreme Court, on motion for rehearing, withdrew the reported opinion
and substituted a new opinion and judgment. See Day & Co. v. Texiand Petroleum, Inc., 786
S.W.2d 667 (rex. 1990).
2. "The executive right is defined as the exclusive power to execute oil and gas leases."
Id. at 550 (citing 2 H. WITLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 338 (1986)).
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exceptions which reduce the estate conveyed."'3 The lower courts, therefore,
reasoned that the executive right covering the Keaton and Young undivided
one-half mineral interest passed to the Shoafs under the warranty deed from
Day & Company because Day & Company failed to reserve or except such
right in the warranty deed.4
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis of the parties' claims by set-
ting forth the principles of law relating to the conveyance or reservation of
executive rights.5 In accordance with such principles, the court found that
Day & Company implicitly retained an undivided one-fourth interest in the
executive right in the ten-acre tract, corresponding to the one-fourth mineral
interest that Day & Company reserved from its conveyance to the Shoafs. 6
The supreme court also found that the Shoafs implicitly received an undi-
vided one-fourth interest in the executive right in the ten-acre tract that cor-
responded to the one-fourth mineral interest Day & Company conveyed to
the Shoafs.7 The issue, then, was which party owned the remaining undi-
vided one-half interest in the executive right that corresponded to Keaton'a
and Young's reserved one-half mineral interest in the ten-acre tract.8
As noted above, Texland claimed that the Shoats owned the undivided
one-half mineral interest corresponding to Keaton's and Young's reservation
because the warranty deed from Day & Company to the Shoafs did not re-
serve or except the interest for Day & Company. Texland based its claim on
the greatest possible estate rule under the Texas Property Code9 and com-
mon law.10 The supreme court disagreed with Texland's argument, finding
that neither rule applied to executive rights. 1 Since the executive power is
3. Day & Co., Inc. v. Texiand Petroleum, Inc., 718 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1986), rev'd, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 549 (July 12, 1989) (citing Cockrell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10 13, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956)).
4. 718 S.W.2d at 389.
5. In the words of the court:
[The executive right] is an essential attribute of a severed mineral estate. When
a mineral interest is reserved or excepted in a deed, the executive right covering
that interest is also retained unless specifically conveyed. However, when a min-
eral interest is granted in a deed, the executive right also impliedly passes to the
grantee to the extent of the grantee's interest unless specifically reserved. There-
fore, whether a mineral interest is reserved or granted, the executive right is
appurtenant to the mineral estate absent a contrary expression in the deed. All
rights inherent in the mineral estate are impliedly reserved, excepted, or con-
veyed, respectively, to the extent the mineral estate itself is reserved, excepted,
or conveyed.




9. "An estate in land that is conveyed or devised is a fee simple unless the estate is
limited by express words or unless a lesser estate is conveyed or devised by construction or
operation of law." Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.001(a)(Vernon 1984).
10. Under common law, a warranty deed passes all of the grantor's estate unless there are
reservations or exceptions reducing the estate conveyed. Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
157 Tex. 10, 14, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1957); Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302(1943).
11. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 551.
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not an estate in land,' 2 neither the statutory nor the common law greatest
possible estate rule was applicable.' 3
The court also noted that the Shoafs bargained for an undivided one-
fourth mineral interest in the ten-acre tract of land and the right to lease
such interest. 14 The Shoals did not bargain for the right to lease Keaton's
and Young's mineral interests in the tract. The supreme court, therefore,
stated that "[a]bsent an expression to the contrary in the deed, we hold that
a conveyance of a mineral interest conveys the right to lease that interest but
no greater executive right."15 Day & Company's conveyance to the Shoafs
of an undivided one-fourth interest in the ten-acre tract included an undi-
vided one-fourth interest in the executive right~to such tract, and reserved
the remaining undivided three-fourths interest in that right to Day &
Company.' 6
Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc 17 arose from a trespass to try title action
concerning the partial assignment of an oil and gas lease. Superior Oil Com-
pany, through an assignment, owned the leasehold rights under a 1937 oil
and gas lease (referred to as the "base lease") covering almost 8,000 acres.
According to the habendum clause of the base lease, the lease would remain
in effect past the primary term as long as production was continuous on any
part of the acreage covered by the base lease, regardless of subsequent divi-
sion of the leased premises into separate tracts. In 1949 Superior assigned its
rights under the base lease in a 329.3-acre tract to Western Drilling Com-
pany. I s Western immediately drilled and completed a producing well on the
329.3-acre tract. This well continued to produce until 1961. Western be-
came defunct in 1965. From 1961 to the time of trial, neither Western nor
its shareholders drilled any additional wells on the tract.
In 1960, prior to the well's cessation of production, the president of West-
12. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Cain, 163 Tex. 323, 355 S.W.2d 506 (1962).
13. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. I. at 551.
14. Id at 552.
15. Id.
16. I
17. 772 S.W.2d 76 (rex. 1989).
18. Such assignment provided, in part, as follows:
THIS ASSIGNMENT IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CON-
DITION AND PROVISION:
1.
All of the right, title, interest and privileges herein conveyed to and conferred
upon Western will cease and terminate and shall revert to and revest in Supe-
rior, unless within thirty (30) days after the date hereof, Western shall com-
mence the actual drilling for oil and gas upon the above described land at a
location thereon which shall satisfy any then existing offset obligation....
2.
Western shall and hereby does assume and agree to perform and discharge all of
the [base] lease obligations, express or implied.... To this end, it is recognized
by the parties hereto... that there now are a number of... off-set wells which
Western shall protect against by the drilling of properly located wells on the
above described land, in due and proper time, and subject to all of the applicable
provisions of this agreement.
Id at 78.
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ern, signing in his individual capacity, conveyed to the Dakota Company,
Inc. "all of [his] right, title and interest... in the [base lease]... insofar as
said lease covers the... 329.3 acres ... ."19 Through subsequent assign-
ments, Ricane Enterprises, Inc. and others, collectively referred to as the
Ricane Group, acquired the Dakota Company's interest. In 1979 the Ricane
Group drilled and completed a new producing well on the tract.
In 1984, Rogers and other shareholders of Western brought a trespass to
try title action against the Ricane Group, seeking to recover possession of
the working interest on the 329.3-acre tract. The shareholders also sought
damages for conversion of oil and casinghead gas produced from the prop-
erty by the Ricane Group. The Ricane Group moved for summary judg-
ment on the following grounds: (1) automatic termination of Western's
rights under the partial assignment; (2) abandonment; (3) laches; and (4)
limitations. The trial court granted the motion "on the grounds urged,"'20
and the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment solely on the basis
of the automatic termination theory.21 The appellate court determined that
paragraph 2, quoted above, made the partial assignment of the base lease
expressly conditioned upon Western's performance of obligations imposed
by the underlying base lease.22 Because Western failed to conduct any drill-
ing operations on the tract for almost twenty-three years following the cessa-
tion of production from the initial well on the tract, the court of appeals held
that Western's rights under the assignment automatically terminated and
reverted to Superior.23
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' holding,
and instead, held that paragraph 2 was a covenant and not a condition.24
Referring to paragraph 1, the Texas high court noted that the parties obvi-
ously knew how to create a condition.25 Since paragraph 2 contained dis-
similar language whereby Western merely agreed to perform all of the
obligations of the base lease, the parties intended such paragraph to act as a
covenant. The court supported its holding by two general rules of construc-
tion: first, a court cannot imply terms that contradict the express language
of a written contract; and, second, doubts as to construction of a provision
should be resolved in favor of a covenant rather than a condition.26 Based
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Rogers v. Ricane Enter., Inc., 775 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987), rev'd, 772
S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989).
22. 775 S.W.2d at 394.
23. Id. at 395.
24. 772 S.W.2d at 79. The important distinction between a condition and a covenant lies
in the appropriate remedy for the breach of each. As the court noted:
Breach of a condition results in automatic termination of the leasehold estate
upon the happening of stipulated events. Breach of a covenant does not auto-
matically terminate the estate, but instead subjects the breaching party to liabil-
ity for monetary damages, or in extraordinary circumstances, the remedy of a
conditional decree of cancellation.
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on its holding that paragraph 2 was not a condition, the court determined
that Western's right under the partial assignment could not automatically
terminate under such paragraph, and therefore, summary judgment could
not be sustained on that ground.27
The court then examined the other theories advanced by the Ricane
Group to determine whether any such theories would support the award of
summary judgment. With respect to its abandonment theory, the Ricane
Group contended that Western and its shareholders abandoned its rights to
the property in question. The Texas Supreme Court rejected such theory on
the well-established principles that an interest in an oil and gas leasehold
estate is an interest in real property, and that real property interests cannot
be abandoned.28 The Ricane Group's next ground for summary judgment
contended that the doctrine of latches barred the shareholders' suit as a mat-
ter of law due to the unreasonable delay in asserting the claims to the lease in
question. The Texas Supreme Court rejected this ground as well, noting that
laches is not a defense in a trespass to try title suit where the plaintiff's right
is based on legal title.29
As a final ground in support of summary judgment, the Ricane Group
contended that the three-year statute of limitation barred the shareholders'
trespass to try title action.30 The shareholders countered that the Ricane
Group was not entitled to summary judgment because they failed to prove
either title31 or color of title32 as a matter of law. The supreme court found
that the Ricane Group did not sufficiently plead or present summary judg-
ment evidence showing its claim of title or color of title.33 Because they
failed to meet their burden of proving adverse possession under the applica-
ble statute, the court found that the three-year statute of limitations could
not sustain the summary judgment. 34
Because none of the theories the Ricane Group asserted in support of its
summary judgment supported such a judgment, the supreme court reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the cause to the trial
court for trial on the merits. 35
27. Id
28. Id at 80.
29. Id.
30. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.024 (Vernon 1986) ("A person must bring
suit to recover real property held by another in peaceable and adverse possession under title or
color of title not later than three years after the day the cause of action accrues.").
31. Title is "a regular chain of transfers of real property from or under the sovereignty of
the soil." TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.021(4) (Vernon 1986).
32. Color of title is a consecutive chain of transfers to the person in possession that "(A) is
not regular because of a muniment that is not properly recorded or is only in writing or be-
cause of a similar defect that does not want of intrinsic fairness or honesty; or (B) is based on a
certificate of headright, land warrant, or land scrip." Id. § 16.021(2).
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A. Surface/Mineral Relationship
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order of
denial of an injunction requiring pipeline burial in Carrigan v. Exxon Com-
pany U.S.A. 36 In this case, the Carrigans owned the surface rights in a cer-
tain tract of land. Exxon was the successor in interest to the original lessee
of the mineral estate granted by the Carrigans' predecessors in interest. The
property was subject to a unitization agreement that had been ratified by the
Carrigans' predecessors. By their lawsuit, the Carrigans sought damages for
oil and chemical spills, and litter and debris, and also sought an injunction
compelling Exxon to bury all of its pipelines below plow depth, to abandon
the cutoff roads it had been using, to clean up the property, and to provide
safety training to the Carrigans concerning the dangers of hydrogen sulfide
gas.37 The district court entered judgment awarding money and damages to
the Carrigans for injury to the surface of the property resulting from Ex-
xon's use of it, but denied the Carrigans the injunctive relief they sought,
reasoning that (1) the unitization agreement abrogated the provision in the
original lease allowing the lessor to require the lessee to bury its pipelines
below plow depth, and (2) the deeds conveyed the surface interest in the
property to the Carrigans, but not the right to require the burial of
pipelines.38
On appeal the Carrigans argued that the trial court erred in holding that
the unitization agreement abrogated the original lease provision requiring
pipeline burial. They asserted that their predecessors in interest, who owned
the surface estate, royalty interest, and reversionary interest in the mineral
estate at the time of the execution of the unitization agreement, entered into
that agreement only in their capacities as royalty interest owners, and not as
owners of the surface estate. Thus, the Carrigans argued, their predecessors
in interest did not abrogate their right to require the lessee to bury its pipe-
lines, which is a right fixed to the surface estate, and that they had an express
right to require such burial.
The appellate court examined the original lease to determine whether it
contained an express provision requiring burial and found that it unambigu-
ously provided such a right.39 The court next examined the unitization
agreement to see whether it abrogated this right. A provision in the unitiza-
tion agreement provided that such agreement amended and modified all ex-
isting leases to the extent that the provisions of the leases conflicted with the
provisions of the unitization agreement. 4 While the unitization agreement
did not expressly address the issue of the lessor's right to require the opera-
36. 877 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1989).
37. Hydrogen sulfide gas is a hazardous by-product of the production of oil and natural
gas in some areas. Id. at 1239 n.5.
38. Id. at 1239.
39. Id. at 1240-41. The lease provided in part: "When required by lessor, lessee will bury
all pipelines below ordinary plow depth .... " Id at 1241.
40. Id. at 1242.
[VCol. 44
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tor to bury its pipelines, the issue before the Fifth Circuit became whether
the terms of the unitization agreement conflicted with the original lease to
such an extent that the lessor's right to require pipeline burial had been
abrogated. 41
In this regard, the court examined the provision in the unitization agree-
ment governing the operator's right to use of the surface.42 The court found
that the terms of this provision created a conflict with the pipeline burial
clause of the original leases because they granted to the operator the right to
use as much of the surface as might be reasonably necessary, without any
provision limiting the right of such use.43 This broad grant of surface usage
rights, without any indication that burial of surface pipelines was required,
led the Fifth Circuit to conclude that the unitization agreement allowed the
operator to lay pipelines (as long as the pipelines were reasonably necessary)
with no requirement that the operator bury the pipelines.44
As additional support for this conclusion, the court noted that the unitiza-
tion agreement provided the surface owners with a right to seek money dam-
ages for surface injury resulting from necessary use of the surface estate by
the operator.45 According to the court, this signified that the parties recog-
nized the possibility that oil and gas operations would interfere with the
surface use of the property, and the contract handled the matter by allowing
for the payment of money damages rather than requiring pipeline burial
upon demand. 46
With regard to the Carrigans' claim that their predecessors in interest did
not abrogate their right to pipeline burial because they entered into the uni-
tization agreement solely in their capacity as royalty owners, the court again
turned to the terms of the unitization agreement. 47 The Fifth Circuit agreed
with the Carrigans' contention that their predecessors in interest signed the
unitization agreement as royalty owners.48 The court, however, noted that
the agreement defined royalty owner to include an owner of land.49 By such
41. Id
42. Article IX, paragraph 20 provided, in part, that:
The working interest owners and royalty owners, to the extent of their rights
and interests, hereby grant to the Unit Operator the right to use or permit the
use of as much of the surface of the land within the unit area as may be reason-
ably necessary for the development and operation of the unit area.... The Unit
Operator shall have a right of way over and across such land, and the right of
ingress and egress thereto and therefrom, for the laying, construction, using,
maintaining, operating, changing, repairing and removing of pipelines .... The
Unit Operator, for the joint account of the working interest owners, shall pay all
damages... resulting from the exercise of the rights and privileges acquired
under the provisions of this paragraph 20.
Id at 1242-43.




47. Id. at 1241.
48. Id
49. Id at 1241-42. "Royalty owner" was defined in Article I of the unitization agreement
to include:
any owner who, subject to a working interest owner's right to search for and
1990]
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definition, the court held that the unitization agreement signed by the Carri-
gans' predecessors in interest as royalty owners included the full extent of
their interest in the property, including their rights relating to the ownership
of the surface estate.50
B. Lessee/Lessor Relationship
L Lease Provisions
Good v. TXO Production Corp.51 involved the construction of an express
covenant to protect against drainage contained in an oil and gas lease be-
tween Good, as lessor, and TXO, as lessee.52 Good sued TXO, alleging that
TXO breached this express covenant by failing to drill a well on the leased
premises as an offset to two gas wells on adjacent tracts that were draining
the Upper Morrow Formation. In response to special issues and instruc-
tions, the jury found that there had not been substantial drainage from the
Upper Morrow Formation, and the trial court entered a take-nothing judg-
ment against Good.
On appeal Good contended that the trial court erred in asking the jury to
find whether or not substantial drainage had occurred. She claimed that the
adjective "substantial" forced her to carry a greater burden of proof than
required by the express covenant contained in her lease. According to
Good, the requirement of substantial drainage related only to the implied
covenant to protect against drainage, and was irrelevant in the context of her
lawsuit for the breach of an express covenant.
The court of appeals disagreed with Good's contentions. Recognizing
that substantial drainage was one of the elements of a cause of action for
breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage, the court found
that the express covenant contained in the lease at issue did not call for a
different standard of conduct.53 The appellate court reached this result
based on the language of the express covenant that, by its own terms, incor-
porated the reasonably prudent operator standard.5 4 The court, therefore,
concluded that the express covenant provided for the same standard of pro-
tection as required under the implied covenant." The express adoption of
the reasonably prudent operator standard, according to the appellate court,
produce unitized substances, owns land, mineral rights, royalties, overriding
royalties, payments out of production, reversionary interests, net profits interests
or other similar rights in and to the unitized substances that may be produced
and saved from the unit area....
Id. at 1241 (Footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 1242.
51. 763 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
52. The covenant provided:
In the event a well or wells producing oil or gas in paying quantities should be
brought in on adjacent land ... and draining the leased premises, lessee agrees
to drill such offset wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill under the
same or similar circumstances.
Id. at 59-60.
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included an independent requirement that the drainage be substantial before
the lessor could maintain an action for breach of a covenant to protect the
lease against drainage, whether the covenant was express or implied.5 6 The
court, therefore, afflirmed the take-nothing judgment. 57
Williams v. Baker Exploration Co. 58 presented an action by Williams and
other lessors under an oil, gas, and mineral lease against Baker Exploration
Company and others, as past or present lessees who owned the working in-
terest in the lease. By their lawsuit, Williams, et al., sought damages for
nonpayment and conversion of oil and gas royalties attributable to produc-
tion from five wells on the lease. Williams, et al., also sued McMurrey Pe-
troleum, Inc., which was the operator of the wells and units involved and
which purchased the oil and gas produced therefrom.
Upon motion by Baker and the other past or present lessees, the trial
court granted summary judgment that Williams, et al., take nothing from
the lessees by their lawsuit. The trial court based its judgment solely upon
the undisputed fact that the lessors had executed division orders for the sale
of their oil and gas to McMurrey. Baker Exploration, et al., persuaded the
trial court that the lessees' duty arising under the division order requiring
the purchaser of production to make payments to the lessor superseded the
lessees' duty under the lease to pay royalties to the lessors. The current and
former lessees relied upon the holdings of Exxon Corp. v. Middleton 5 9 and
Cabot Corp. v. Brown.6"
The court of appeals, however, reversed the summary judgment and re-
manded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 61 The court dis-
agreed with the appellees' reading of the Brown and Middleton cases, and
stated that the holdings of such cases do not excuse lessees from payment of
the lessors' royalty merely because the lessors executed division orders in
favor of a purchaser of the leasehold oil and gas.62 The court held that only
an express provision in a division order could effectively release lessees from
their royalty payment obligation. 63 Thus, the court rejected the appellees'
contention that they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
merely because of the lessors' execution of division orders.64
Thomas v. Thomas65 presented matters of first impression to Texas courts
regarding application of the free gas clause in an oil and gas lease. In 1938,
J.N. Duncan, as lessor, executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease in favor of
Phillips Petroleum Company, as lessee, covering the relevant tract of land in
56. Id.
57. Id. at 62.
58. 767 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ denied).
59. 613 S.W.2d 240 (rex. 1981) (Division orders executed by royalty owners obligating
the lessees to pay royalties at lower rates than those under the lease royalty clauses, are never-
theless binding on the royalty owners until revoked).
60. 754 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1987) (following Exxon Corp. v. Middleton).




65. 767 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
1990]
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Gray County, Texas. The lease contained a free-gas clause. 66 Duncan sub-
sequently conveyed the surface and a portion of the mineral interest to Jerry
Thomas, the father of appellant Stephen Thomas, and appellees Gregory
Thomas and the other children of Jerry Thomas. Phillips Petroleum drilled
a producing well on the leased premises; thus, production from the well per-
petuated the lease.
In 1938, when Duncan and Phillips Petroleum executed the lease, no
dwelling existed on the leased premises. Jerry Thomas and his wife, Patri-
cia, placed the first house on the property in 1950 and began taking the free
gas provided for in the oil and gas lease. Jerry and Patricia continued to live
in the home until their deaths in 1975 and 1980, respectively. The house
remained vacant following Patricia's death except for an eighteen-month pe-
riod when the house was rented to a tenant.
Upon the death of Jerry Thomas, his interest in the property passed to his
wife. Stephen Thomas thereafter purchased from his mother a one-acre
tract within the leased premises. Stephen built a house on this tract and, in
1975, began taking free gas from the producing well for use in his home.
Following the death of Patricia Thomas, the property Qess Stephen's one-
acre tract) passed to Stephen and Gregory Thomas and the other children.
In 1985, the Thomas heirs partitioned the surface estate of the tract, pursu-
ant to which Stephen received certain acreage contiguous to the one-acre
tract of land he had previously purchased, and Gregory and the other
Thomas children received the remaining acreage, which included the pro-
ducing gas well and the original Thomas dwelling built in 1950.
Phillips learned of Stephen's use of the free gas in 1986, and thereafter
notified the Thomas heirs that the lease clause limited free gas to one dwell-
ing. Phillips requested the Thomas heirs to determine among themselves
which dwelling would receive the free gas. Both Stephen and Gregory, et
al., claimed ownership of the right under the free gas clause. Gregory, et al.,
asserted entitlement to such right by virtue of being successors in interest to
the surface estate where Jerry and Patricia Thomas placed the first dwelling
on the property in 1950. Stephen claimed ownership of the free gas right as
a result of his ownership of the only house presently occupied on the leased
premises. According to Stephen, the right to free gas for the original dwell-
ing terminated when the dwelling ceased to be occupied, and thereafter, it
attached to Stephen's dwelling. Gregory, et al., brought a declaratory judg-
ment action against Stephen in order to resolve the dispute. The trial court
determined that Gregory Thomas, et al., owned the free gas interest.
Recognizing the case presented matters of first impression in Texas, the
Amarillo court of appeals looked to cases from other jurisdiction for gui-
dance and set out the general principles of the cases regarding free gas
66. The lease provided that "Lessor shall have the privilege at his risk and expense of
using gas from any gas well on said land for stoves and inside lights in the principal dwelling
thereon out of any surplus gas not needed for operations hereunder." Id. at 508 (emphasis
omitted).
[Vol. 44
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clauses in oil and gas leases.67 With regard to the case at hand, the court
noted that the first dwelling on the property was built in 1950 after the exe-
cution of the oil and gas lease in 1938.68 Thus, the right to receive the free
gas attached to the original dwelling in 1950.69 The right to free gas, as an
interest in real property, can only be acquired or lost by the usual methods of
transferring an interest in real property, such as by gift, sale, exchange, or by
adverse possession.70 Since Gregory, et al., or their predecessors in title to
the surface rights did not transfer the free gas interest to Stephen, the inter-
est continued to be owned by Gregory, et al., as successors in interest to the
surface estate where the principal dwelling was established in 1950 by Jerry
and Patricia Thomas.71 The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment in favor of the successors in interest to the original principal
dwelling.72
Construction of a dry hole clause was at issue in Burns v. Louisiana Land
& Exploration Co. 73 In 1981, Bums, as lessor, and McMoran Production
Company, as lessee, entered into an oil and gas lease covering a certain tract
of land. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company (LL&E) subsequently ac-
quired certain interests in the lease from MeMoran. In 1983 McMoran or
LL&E re-entered a dry hole that a previous lessee drilled on the premises
and commenced reworking operations. The operations were unsuccessful,
and in June 1984 McMoran or LL&E again plugged and abandoned the well
as a dry hole. The primary term of the lease expired in July 1984, at which
time no operations were in progress on the lease. On September 2, 1984,
LL&E entered the property and drilled a new well. LL&E plugged and
abandoned this well as a dry hole in April 1985.
Bums brought suit against LL&E and McMoran in state court, seeking
damages for trespass. Bums claimed that the lease expired on July 20, 1984,
67. As stated by the court:
It is the general rule ... that the free gas clause in the oil and gas lease is a
covenant running with the surface estate of the property. The surface estate
receives the benefits and the mineral estate has the burden. Where, as here, the
free gas clause is limited to the "principal dwelling," that burden to the mineral
estate cannot be extended to additional dwellings without the consent of the
mineral estate owner. The right to take free gas under a free gas clause in an oil
and gas lease is transferrable and assignable as is any other property interest.
Likewise, the burden to the mineral estate is transferrable and assignable as is
any other property interest.
The settled general rule is that the right to free gas is construed as a covenant
running with that portion of the land upon which the principal dwelling was
located at the time the original lease was executed. When there is no dwelling in
existence on the leased premises at the time of the execution of the original oil
and gas lease and a principal dwelling is placed on the premises years later, the
right to receive the free gas aittached to that portion of the surface estate where
the dwelling is located.
Id. at 509-10 (citations omitted).
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and that LL&E's drilling of a well after that time constituted trespass.
Bums asserted that the tresspass destroyed the speculative value in the lease-
hold estate. The defendants removed the case to federal court, where they
filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The district
court granted this motion, holding that no trespass occurred because the
lease was in effect in September 1984 when LL&E drilled the well. 74
Neither party disputed that the primary term of the lease ended on July
20, 1984. Thus, the lease was in effect at the time LL&E began drilling only
if some express provision of the lease extended its term. LL&E and
McMoran relied on the dry hole provision of the lease." Conceding that no
drilling or reworking operations were underway at the time of the expiration
of the primary term, the defendants relied on the portion of the sentence
allowing an extension of the lease when the lessee completed a dry hole
within ninety days of the expiration of the primary term.
LL&E and McMoran asserted that they completed a dry hole on the
leased premises when they terminated their unsuccessful reworking opera-
tion, and the termination was within ninety days of the end of the primary
term. The drilling of the new well, commenced on September 2, 1984, was
within ninety days following the termination of the reworking operations.
Cessation of operations spanned fewer than 90 days. The defendants
claimed that the lease was, therefore, in effect when they drilled the addi-
tional well.
To determine whether the termination of the unsuccessful reworking op-
erations constituted the completion of a dry hole within the meaning of the
lease, the Fifth Circuit first examined the lease for a definition of "comple-
tion of a dry hole."'' 6 Finding no such definition, the appellate court next
examined the context of the lease in which the parties used the phrase "com-
pletion of a dry hole" to determine whether completion must follow the
drilling of a well, as opposed to reworking.7 The district court below noted
that the second sentence of paragraph IX used the terms drilling or rework-
ing to describe the actions sufficient to extend the lease, and that the parties
used the same terms to specify the operations that must be commenced
within ninety days of termination of unsuccessful operations.73 The district
court then concluded that the parties intended the general phrase "shall
have completed a dry hole" to include those same operations that was re-
74. Id. at 1018.
75. Paragraph IX of the lease provided:
If at the expiration of the primary term, oil or gas is not being produced from
the leased premises, but Lessee is then engaged in drilling or reworking opera-
tions thereon or shall have completed a dry hole thereon within ninety (90) days
prior to the end of the primary term, the lease shall remain in force so long as
drilling or reworking of such well or of an additional well or wells are prose-
cuted in good faith, with no cessation of more than ninety (90) consecutive days,
and if they result in production of oil and gas so long thereafter as oil or gas is
produced, subject to the provisions of Paragraph X hereof.
Id. (emphasis by the court).
76. Id.
77. Id at 1019.
78. Id.
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ferred to in the rest of the sentence-i.e., drilling or reworking.7 9
On appeal Burns objected to the district court's interpretation, arguing
that the termination of the unsuccessful reworking operation did not consti-
tute the completion of a dry hole. Burns claimed that drilling is an element
of completion. This interpretation relied on the use of the phrase "drill and
abandon a dry hole" in the first sentence of paragraph IX.8° Burns con-
tended that the phrase "drill and abandon a dry hole" contained in the first
sentence of paragraph IX was parallel to the phrase "have completed a dry
hole" as used in the second sentence. The Fifth Circuit rejected Burn's argu-
ment, finding that the second sentence controlled the case."' The immediate
context of the phrase "have completed a dry hole" in the second sentence,
therefore, was more significant than the terms used in the first sentence.82
The court further found that the immediate context supported the conclu-
sion that the termination of operations for the drilling or reworking of a dry
hole constituted completion of a dry hole so as to extend the lease under the
applicable clause in the second sentence of paragraph IX.83
The court also supported its construction of the lease as allowing an exten-
sion whenever reworking operations terminated within ninety days of the
end of the primary term (without a cessation of operations of more than
ninety days) by examination of paragraph X, the related lease provision ref-
erenced in the second sentence of paragraph IX.84 First, the court recog-
79. Id
80. The sentence provided:
If, prior to the discovery of oil or gas on the leased premises, Lessee shall drill
and abandon a dry hole or holes thereon, or if, after discovery of oil or gas the
production thereof should cease, this lease shall not terminate if Lessee com-
mences reworking or additional drilling operations within ninety (90) days
thereafter, or if it be within the primary term commences or resumes the pay-
ment or tender of rentals or commences operations for drilling or reworking on
or before the rental payment date next ensuing after the expiration of ninety (90)
days from the date of completion of the dry hole or cessation of production.
IA at 1017.
81. Id at 1019.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id. at 1019-20. Paragraph X provided, in part:
If after the expiration of the primary term this lease is being maintained in
force and effect, in whole or in part, it shall, except as specifically provided
below, nevertheless terminate as to all of the acreage and depths covered hereby
except as following: ...
(3) This lease shall remain in full force and effect insofar as it covers all acre-
age then covered hereby, if at the expiration of the primary term or less than
ninety (90) days prior to the expiration of the primary term Lessee is engaged in
actual drilling or reworking operations on a well located on the leased premises,
or on acreage pooled therewith, and shall continue so long as Lessee prosecutes
such operations with due diligence and in a good and workmanlike manner in a
good faith effort to establish oil and gas production from the leased premises,
and so long thereafter as Lessee does not allow more than ninety (90) days to
elapse between the completion or abandonment of one well drilled under the
provisions hereof and the commencement of actual drilling operations of an-
other well on said land, or acreage pooled therewith, such operations being




nized that paragraph X had no independent force because it merely qualified
or allowed the application of extensions defined elsewhere in the lease.8 5
The court held, however, that paragraph X explicitly and clearly allowed an
extension of the lease if the lessee actually engaged in drilling or reworking
operations within fewer than ninety days before the end of the primary
term.86 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that such language in paragraph X(3)
extending the lease for reworking operations would lose its full meaning if
the court restrictively construed the extension in the second sentence of par-
agraph IX.87
Based on the repetition of the phrase "drilling or reworking" in the second
sentence of paragraph IX, and the expansive wording of the continuous op-
erations clause in paragraph X(3), the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
phrase "completed a dry hole" as used in the second sentence of paragraph
IX meant termination of unsuccessful drilling or reworking operations.88
Since LL&E's reworking operations on the dry hole terminated within
ninety days prior to the end of the primary term of the lease, and subsequent
operations for the drilling of a well commenced within ninety days following
the termination, the express provisions of the lease extended it beyond the
primary term.89 Consequently, the lessees committed no trespass.90 The
Fifth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the summary judgment of the district court
in favor of LL&E and McMoran.91
At issue in Sowell v. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. 92 were royalties on
"drips" collected in Northwest's gathering system. 93 In 1927 the trustees of
the Burnett Trust executed a gas lease to Empire Gas and Fuel covering the
Burnett Ranch. In 1936 trustees of the same Trust executed an oil and gas
lease to Empire Oil and Refining covering the same lands. By 1937 Cities
Service Gas Company (CSGC) owned the leasehold interest under both
leases.
Soon after production of gas from the leased premises began in the late
1920s, trespassers started entering the Ranch in order to take the drips. The
trespassers who took the drips often damaged the pipeline and sometimes
caused fires at the drip sites. Thus, the trespassers equally concerned the
Burnett Trust and the gas lessees. In 1937 the Burnett Trust and CSGC
entered into an agreement by which CSGC promised to arrange for the drips
to be periodically removed from the drip pots, thereby discouraging trespass-
ers, and the Burnett Trust agreed to waive its rights to any royalties from the
gasoline accumulated by such drips.
In 1953, through a series of transactions undertaken for purposes of ob-
85. Id. at 1020.
86. Id.
87. Id.




92. 703 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
93. "The drips are collected in drip pots which are located along the pipeline." Id. at 576
n.2.
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taining Federal Power Commission price benefits, CSGC assigned all of its
interest under the two relevant leases to Cities Service Gas Producing Com-
pany (Cities Producing). Cities Producing, as seller, and CSGC, as buyer,
then entered into a gas purchase contract regarding the gas produced from
the leases at issue and others in the area. CSGC and Cities Producing were
both subsidiaries of Cities Service Company. In 1963, Conoco succeeded to
the interest of Cities Producing. Northwest succeeded to the interest of
CSGC in 1982.
The lawsuit by the current Burnett trustees originally included Conoco,
Inc. and Cities Service Company, as defendants, in addition to Northwest
Central Pipeline Corporation. Conoco and Cities Service Company, how-
ever, settled with plaintiffs, leaving Northwest as the only remaining defend-
ant. The plaintiffs' first cause of action sought a declaration by the court
that the lease obligated Northwest to pay royalties to the Burnett Trust on
the drips collected in Northwest's gathering system. The Plaintiffs' second
cause of action sought damages for the admitted nonpayment of such royal-
ties. The court denied the plaintiffs recovery on such causes of action and
held that Northwest was not liable for payment of liquid royalties to the
trust.
94
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that, although the 1927 gas
lease entitled the Burnett Trust to receive royalties for drips, the 1937 agree-
ment between the Burnett Trust and CSCG constituted a modification of the
gas lease.9" By an express provision in the modification, the Burnett Trust
gave up its right to receive royalties on the drips.96 The Plaintiffs argued
that the modification did not constitute a waiver of its right to royalty pay-
ments because at the time it entered into the 1937 agreement the drips had
no monetary value. The Plaintiffs reasoned since the drips had no value and
consequently the plaintiffs could not receive any royalties from the drips,
then their royalty interest was nonexistent. The Burnett trustees' argument
concluded that they could not have waived a nonexistent right.
The court found such argument faulty in several respects. First, the court
rejected the Burnett trustees' contention that the drips had no value, citing
the undisputed evidence regarding the trespassers' conversion of such
drips.97 Even assuming that the drips had no monetary value, the court held
that that fact did not mean that the plaintiffs' royalty interest was nonexis-
tent.98 The court noted that the plaintiffs obtained the royalty interest in the
drips in 1927 when they entered into the original lease, and their interest
continued to exist until 1937, when the plaintiffs relinquished their interest
to CSGC.99
Also, the court held that Northwest had no responsibility for the payment
of liquid royalties to the plaintiffs because it was not in privity of contract or
94. Id. at 583.
95. Id at 577.
96. Id





in privity of estate with the plaintiffs. 00 Northwest was not in privity of
contract with the Burnett Trust because it was not the original lessee under
the 1927 gas lease or the 1936 oil and gas lease.' 01 Nor was Northwest in
privity of estate with the plaintiffs during the relevant time period.102 The
plaintiffs sought damages for nonpayment of royalties for the years 1978
through 1985. Northwest's predecessor in interest, CSGC, was in privity of
estate with the plaintiffs for some time; however, the relationship ceased in
1953. In that year, all of CSGC's interest in the two leases transferred to
Cities Producing, which later became Conoco. Northwest, through its pred-
ecessor CSGC, merely became the purchaser of gas produced from the lease.
Thus, since 1953, neither Northwest nor its predecessor had responsibility
for the payment of royalties to the Burnett Trust. Rather, the obligation was
the responsibility of Cities Producing and Conoco. As stated above, the
plaintiffs had previously settled with Conoco.
Finally, the court found that even if the 1953 assignment from CSGC to
Cities Producing insufficiently discharged CSGC (and Northwest) from the
obligation under the lease to pay royalties, the plaintiffs subsequently agreed
to the substitution of Conoco for Northwest as lessee. 10 3 Since 1963, when
Conoco succeeded to the interest of Cities Producing, the plaintiffs directed
all of their correspondence regarding the lessee's obligations under the lease
to Conoco rather than CSGC or Northwest. The plaintiffs looked solely to
Conoco for compliance with the leases and payment of the royalties.
By another cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged that Northwest did not
ratably take gas from the wells on the Burnett Ranch. The Burnett trustees
claimed that statutory provisions and provisions under the 1953 gas
purchase contract obligated Northwest to ratably take such gas. As grounds
for the imposition of a statutory duty to take ratably, the plaintiffs relied on
the Texas Common Purchaser Act.1°4 Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted
that Northwest violated section 111.086, which prevents discrimination in
favor of one producer against another producer in the same field and dis-
crimination between separate fields in the state. The court rejected the plain-
tiffs' statutory claim, holding that section 111.086 did not provide for a
private cause of action for any violation thereof.'0 5 Rather, the applicable
statutes provided for an administrative proceeding before the Railroad Com-
mission or a suit by the state attorney general.10 6
Turning to the plaintiffs' allegation of contractual duty to ratably take gas,
the court noted that the 1953 gas purchase agreement between CSGC and
Cities Producing did require CSGC, as buyer, to take gas in sufficient quanti-
ties to allow Cities Producing's wells to produce ratably as defined in the




104. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 111.081-.097 (Vernon 1978).
105. 703 F. Supp. at 580.
106. Id.
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contract. 107 The plaintiffs claimed that they were an intended third-party
beneficiary to the gas purchase agreement. After examining the 1953 con-
tract, and considering the oral testimony, the court found that the Burnett
Trust failed to meet its burden of proving that it was an intended beneficiary
of the contract between CSGC and Cities Producing.'0" At the time the
parties executed the contract, Cities Producing owned the leasehold interest
on nearby tracts. The contract required CSGC to ratably take gas from all
of the wells in which Cities Producing had a leasehold interest and not just
those on the Burnett Ranch.'1 9 The court found that this fact indicated that
the contracts concerned CSGC's and Cities Producing's interests in the
wells, and not the interests of individual royalty owners such as the Burnett
Ranch. Moreover, CSGC's directed the promise to take ratably under the
contract at Cities Producing, not at the individual royalty owners.110 Addi-
tionally, the testimony at trial did not support the plaintiffs' claim that they
were intended third-party beneficiaries. In fact, the testimony indicated that
the sole purpose for the 1953 transaction was for the benefit of CSGC.111
The court found no evidence of any intent on the part of the parties to the
contract to benefit the royalty owners. 112 Having found that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to recover under their claims regarding liquid royalties or
their claims regarding ratable take, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' causes
of action.' 13
Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, Inc. v. De Hinojosa114 involved the enforce-
ability of a liquidated damages provision contained in an oil, gas, and min-
eral lease. Trinidad De Hinojosa, lessor under an oil, gas, and mineral lease,
sued Trafalgar House and other defendants, as lessees under such lease, for
breach of the notice of assignment provision, and sought to recover liqui-
dated damages specified in the lease.115
107. Id at 581.
108. Id
109. Id. at 582.
110. The provision in question required CSGC to take a "sufficient quantity [of gas] to
allow Seller's... wells to produce ratably.. . ." Id
111. The manager of CSGC in 1953 testified that the reason that CSGC assigned its inter-
est in the oil and gas leases to Cities Producing, and then entered into a gas purchase contract
to purchase from Cities Producing the gas that it once owned, was because of pricing benefits
under the Federal Power Commission's regulations. Id
112. Id.
113. Id at 583.
114. 773 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
115. Part of the provision in dispute was:
The right of either party hereunder may be assigned in whole or in part, and the
provisions hereof shall extend to their heirs, successors and assigns; .... In the
event of assignment, LESSEE, its successors and assigns, shall give notice of the
fact of such assignment and the name and address of the Assignee within thirty
(30) days after such assignment; and, LESSOR shall likewise be notified upon
each subsequent assignment. Upon each failure of the LESSEE, its successors
and assigns, to comply with the foregoing "notice of assignment", said LESSEE,
his successors and assigns shall jointly and severally forfeit and pay unto the





The trial court rendered judgment in favor of De Hinojosa in the amount
of $20,600. Trafalgar House and other judgment debtors appealed, contend-
ing that the liquidated damage provision in the lease constituted an unen-
forceable penalty.
The court of appeals recognized that a provision for liquidated damages in
a contract is enforceable if the amount provided for reasonably estimates the
harm caused by a future breach, and the damages resulting from such breach
are difficult to predict. 1 6 Such a provision is unenforceable, however, if it is
simply a penalty to induce performance of the contract.1 17
Turning to the evidence at trial regarding the liquidated damages provi-
sion, the appellate court focused on testimony from the defendants' expert
witness. 113 That witness rejected the idea that De Hinojosa could never be
damaged by a breach of the notice of assignment provision. The witness,
however, acknowledged that a lessor who was a lay person, like De Hi-
nojosa, would require a lawyer or a landman to analyze any assignments and
courthouse records in order to determine who had a right to be on the leased
premises and who would be responsible for any damages to the property as
the result of drilling operations. The expert further testified that, in the case
of multiple assignments, a check of the courthouse records would not neces-
sarily show every assignment because many assignees never record such in-
struments. In addition, the defendants' expert witness confirmed that his fee
to read assignments and other records was $150 an hour. Due to the fact
that certain assignments may not be filed, however, the expert conceded the
impossibility of accurately estimating the expense of locating and reviewing
such unfiled assignments.
Turning its attention to the contractual provision at issue, the appellate
court held that the liquidated damage provision at issue was narrowly
drafted to take effect only upon the breach of an important contractual obli-
gation, and not for any trivial breach of contract.1 19 The court of appeals,
therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment for De Hinojosa.120
2. Implied Lease Covenants
In a landmark decision, the Texas Supreme Court, in Sun Exploration &
Production Co. v. Jackson,'2' withdrew its prior opinion122 and substituted a
new opinion, holding that in Texas an oil and gas lease contains no implied
covenant requiring a lessee to explore the leased premises.123
In 1938, the Jackson family leased the oil, gas, and mineral right covering
their 10,000-acre ranch in Chambers County to Sun Exploration & Produc-




119. Id at 799-800.
120. Id at 800.
121. 783 S.W.2d 202 (rex. 1989).
122. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604 (July 13, 1988).
123. 783 S.W.2d at 205
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and drilled a total of sixty-five wells on the leased premises-thirty-seven of
which were producing at the time of trial. All of the producing wells at the
time of trial were in the Oyster Bayou Field, which covered approximately
1800 acres.
In 1979 the Jacksons denied Sun access to the south half of the lease. Sun
brought an action for a judicial declaration that the lease was valid and for a
permanent injunction prohibiting the Jacksons from denying Sun access to
the lease. The Jacksons counterclaimed, seeking cancellation of the lease
and asserting that Sun had breached implied covenants to reasonably de-
velop and explore the lease. The jury found that Sun had not failed to rea-
sonably develop the lease, but had failed to reasonably explore the lease.
Based on these findings, the trial court rendered judgment for the Jacksons,
unconditionally cancelling a portion of the lease and conditionally cancelling
much of the remainder of the lease.
On appeal the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding
a breach of an implied covenant to explore and develop the lease.124 The
court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's unconditional cancellation of
most of the lease, but reversed and remanded the part of the judgment condi-
tionally cancelling the remainder of the lease for further consideration of the
reasonableness of the imposed drilling requirements. 125
The supreme court stated that the issue was "whether there exists in
Texas oil and gas leases an implied covenant to explore, independent of the
implied covenant of reasonable development."12 6 The court found that its
prior decision in Clifton v. Koontz 12 7 was dispositive of the issue.128 The
court noted that in Clifton it had held that no implied covenant of further
exploration existed independently of the implied covenant of reasonable de-
velopment. 129 The covenant of reasonable development covered all wells
drilled after initial production was achieved, including additional wells in
producing formations and wells in "strata different from that from which
production is being obtained." 130 The supreme court then characterized its
Clifton decision as holding that to establish an alleged breach of implied
covenant of further development, the lessor must prove a reasonable expec-
tation of profit to lessor and lessee from the drilling of additional wells.13'
According to the court, if the lessor proves that a reasonably prudent opera-
tor would have drilled the well (i.e., that the operator would have a reason-
able expectation of profit), then that well is within the implied covenant of
reasonable development, regardless of whether the parties consider the well
to be exploratory or developmental. 132
124. 715 S.W.2d 199, 203 (rex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986), rey'd, 703 S.W.2d 202
(rex. 1989).
125. 715 S.W.2d at 206.
126. 785 S.W.2d at 203.
127. 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
128. 783 S.W.2d at 204.
129. Id.





Reviewing the record below, the court noted that the jury found that Sun
had not failed to reasonably develop the entire Jackson lease, and held that
this finding was dispositive of the case.133 Having determined that no im-
plied covenant to explore existed independently of the implied covenant for
reasonable development, and that the jury had found no breach of the cove-
nant to reasonably develop, the court held that Sun had not breached any
implied lease covenant.134
III. ISSUES INVOLVING GAS PURCHASE CONTRACTS
A. Take-or-Pay Disputes
Lone Star Gas Co. v. G.S.G. Royalty Corp. 135 was an appeal from a sum-
mary judgment rendered in favor of G.S.G. Royalty Corporation involving a
take-or-pay gas purchase contract. Lone Star was the purchaser under the
contract, and G.S.G. was an assignee of the seller. The contract required
Lone Star to take or pay for (whether or not taken) all of the casinghead gas
tendered to Lone Star, and seventy-five percent of the delivery capacity of
the seller's gas wells. The delivery capacity was initially based on deliver-
ability tests performed in accordance with Texas Railroad Commission
rules. A contract mechanism reduced the purchaser's delivery capacity obli-
gation if actual deliverability was less than the tested delivery capacity. 136
On appeal Lone Star claimed that the trial court erred in awarding sum-
mary judgment because G.S.G. did not establish as a' matter of law that
Lone Star failed to take or pay for the required volumes of gas. With respect
to gas well gas, G.S.G.'s summary judgment evidence showed that Lone Star
failed to take or pay for seventy-five percent of the initial delivery capacity.
Lone Star's summary judgment response alleged that the deemed test provi-
sion operated to reduce Lone Star's minimum purchase obligations. Fur-
thermore, according to Lone Star's summary judgment evidence, its actual
purchases during the life of the contract were far in excess of the minimum
obligations. With respect to casinghead gas, the contract required Lone Star
to purchase all casinghead gas tendered by the seller. G.S.G.'s summary
judgment proof showed that the casinghead gas delivery capacity was in ex-
cess of the amount actually purchased by Lone Star. Lone Star responded
by claiming such delivery capacity irrelevant; instead the quantity of casing-
head gas tendered controlled.
The Dallas court of appeals held that G.S.G.'s summary judgment evi-
dence did not establish its right to recover as a matter of law for breach of
the take-or-pay provisions under the gas purchase contract with respect to
133. Id at 204-205.
134. Id. at 205.
135. 757 S.W.2d 457 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
136. Such provision stated:
[I]f during any day Seller cannot deliver a quantity of gas equal to the delivery
capacity determined by the next preceding test, then such reduced quantity will
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gas well gas or casinghead gas.137 The appellate court reversed and re-
manded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.1 38
The main issues in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co. '39 con-
cerned the proper construction of certain provisions in a gas purchase con-
tract in the context of a take-or-pay dispute. ARCO, as gas producer,
entered into four virtually identical gas contracts with ANR, an interstate
national pipeline. The contracts obligated ANR to take a certain quantity of
gas, or to pay for such gas if not taken. Although three provisions of the
contracts were at issue, the court of appeals considered only two: the force
majeure provision 1'4 and the royalty provision.141
ANR's major customer was Michigan Consolidated Gas Company (Mich-
Con). On June 1, 1985, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
Order No. 380142 became effective. Prior to the effective date of Order 380,
MichCon contracted to pay for a certain minimum quantity of gas, regard-
less of whether MichCon actually took that gas. Order 380 relieved Mich-
Con of this obligation and permitted it to purchase gas from sellers other
than ANR.1 43 ANR claimed that FERC Order 380 constituted force
majeure under the contracts and thereby decreased the amount of gas the
contract required ANR to purchase from ARCO. ARCO contended that a
mere decline in sales did not constitute an event of force majeure under the
contract.
137. Id. at 460.
138. Id
139. 768 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
140. The force majeure clause stated:
If either Buyer or Seller is rendered unable, wholly or in part, by force
majeure or any other cause of any kind not reasonably within such party's con.
trol to perform or comply with any obligation or condition of this Agreement
... such obligation or condition shall be suspended during the continuance of
the inability so caused and such party shall be relieved of liability and shall
suffer no prejudice for failure to perform the same during such period; .... The
term "force majeure" shall include, without limitation by the following enumer-
ation, acts of God and the public enemy, the elements, fire accidents, break-
downs, shut-downs for purposes of necessary repairs, relocation or construction
of facilities, breakage or accidents to wells, machinery or lines of pipe, the neces-
sity of making repairs or alterations to machinery or lines of pipe, inability to
obtain materials, supplies, permits, or labor to perform or comply with any obli-
gation or condition of this Agreement, strikes and any other industrial, civil or
public disturbance, any act or omission (including failure to take gas) of a pur-
chaser of substantial quantities of gas from Buyer which is excused by any event
or occurrence of the character herein defined as constituting force majeure, and
any laws, orders, rules, regulations, acts or restraints of any government or gov-
ernmental body or authority, civil or military.
Id at 780.
141. The royalty provision provided:
Seller hereby expressly reserves and excepts from the terms of this Agreement
such portion of the gas produced from the reservoirs subject to this Agreement
as Seller's lessor may be entitled to take or receive under the terms of Seller's
leases....
Id. at 779.




On the basis of Burkhart Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co. 144 the court
agreed with ANR. 45 In that case the Oklahoma federal district court held
that FERC Order No. 380 was an act of force majeure within the definition
of that term in a contract containing an almost identical force majeure provi-
sion.' 46 The Houston appellate court held that since MichCon was a pur-
chaser of substantial quantities of gas from ANR, and that FERC Order No.
380 was a regulation of a governmental body, the force majeure provision
covered the event.' 47 Whether this force majeure event rendered MichCon
or ANR unable to comply with the provisions of the contracts was a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.148 The jury found that ANR had not failed to
comply with the take-or-pay provisions of the contract.' 49
The appellate court next considered the royalty provision. The four con-
tracts involved in the lawsuit covered properties located on the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf that ARCO had leased from the federal government. Under
each lease the federal government reserved a one-sixth royalty that it could
elect to take in kind. If the government did not take one-sixth of the gas
produced, the lease obligated ARCO to sell the gas attributable to the roy-
alty interest and pay the proceeds to the government. ANR claimed that the
gas purchase contracts expressly excepted from the terms of the Agreement
one-sixth of the gas produced. ARCO, however, took the position that gas
was excluded from the contract under the royalty reservation only if the
government elected to take its royalty by taking gas in kind. Again, the
appellate court disagreed with ARCO's reasoning. The court held that
ARCO's construction of the royalty reservation would significantly change
the clear and unambiguous terms of the contracts.' 50 Having overruled
ARCO's other points of error, or found that ARCO had waived such
points, 51 the court affirmed the trial court's take-nothing judgment. 52
B. Other Issues
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. v. American National Petroleum Co. 153
involved claims by American National Petroleum Company (ANPC) and
Oil Investments, Ltd. (OIL) against Transcontinental Gas Pipeline
(Transco) for breach of two gas purchase contracts and tortious interference
with gas balancing agreements. The first gas purchase contract was a 1981
agreement between OIL and ANPC, as sellers, and Transco, as purchaser,
regarding gas produced from the Vermilion Field in Louisiana. This con-
tract, as amended, obligated Transco to take or pay for certain minimum
quantities of gas during specified time periods. It also contained a market-
144. No. 87-C-257-C (N.D. Okla. July 5, 1988).
145. 768 S.W.2d at 781.
146. No. 87-C-257-C (N.D. Okla. July 5, 1988).
147. 768 S.W.2d at 781-82.
148. Id
149. Id at 782.
150. Id.
151. Id at 782-85.
152. Id
153. 763 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
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out clause allowing Transco to propose a reduced contract price based on
market conditions. The contract further provided that if the the sellers
found Transco's proposal unacceptable, the sellers' sole remedy was the
right to release the gas from the contract.
The second gas purchase contract was a 1979 agreement between ANPC,
as seller, and Transco, as purchaser, regarding gas produced from the
Oakvale Field in Mississippi. This contract, as amended, did not contain a
take-or-pay provision; however, Transco was obligated to take ANPC's gas
ratably with other producers in the Oakvale Field. This contract contained
a special provision allowing Transco, under certain conditions, temporarily
to reduce the contract price in order to remain competitive with the existing
market.
In 1985, Transco developed an "omnibus agreement," which it attempted
to force all of its producers to execute. According to the terms of this agree-
ment, the producers would waive all outstanding liability claims against
Transco, and would agree to lower contract prices and reduce Transco's
purchase obligations. In order to pressure its producers to execute the agree-
ment, Transco began to take only three percent of the gas capacity of each
nonsigning producer, regardless of the contractual obligations. ANPC and
OIL refused to execute the omnibus agreement, and Transco applied its
three percent take policy to the gas covered by the Vermilion and Oakvale
contracts. Additionally, Transco exercised its market-out right by adoption
of the market price for spot gas that was much less than the price for dedi-
cated gas. Evidence at trial indicated that Transco paid more to producers
who executed the omnibus agreement than it did to A.NPC and OIL and
others who refused to sign the 1985 agreement.
ANPC and OIL were parties to a gas balancing agreement with the other
fractional interest owners in the Vermilion Field. ANPC was a party to a
similar agreement with other owners in the Oakvale Field. As a result of
Transco's three percent policy, ANPC and OIL became underbalanced in
the Vermilion Field.
ANPC and OIL brought this suit against Transco. Following trial, the
jury found that Transco failed to act in good faith under the Vermilion gas
purchase contracts regarding its obligation to take certain minimum quanti-
ties of gas.15 4 As damages, the jury awarded $348,211 for Transco's failure
to purchase the monthly minimum quantities, and $352,875 for its failure to
purchase the annual minimum quantities under the contract. The jury fur-
ther found that Transco failed to act in good faith in its exercise of its mar-
ket-out right, and the jury awarded $637,900 as damages. Finding that
Transco's actions amounted to tortious interference with the gas balancing
agreements, the jury awarded $16,000,000 in exemplary damages to ANPC
and OIL.
On motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict by ANPC and OIL,
154. By agreement of the parties, the issues regarding breach of the Oakvale contract were
submitted to the court, and the court awarded $881,172 in damages, which was not contested
on appeal by Transco.
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the court modified the jury award so as to provide $783,383 in lieu of
$348,211, $726,723 in lieu of $352,875, and $2,376,609 in lieu of $637,900.
The judgment also awarded ANPC and OIL attorneys' fees in the amount of
$1 million. Finally, as relevant here, the judgment made permanent a previ-
ous temporary injunction that restrained Transco from refusing to pay the
proper price to ANPC and OIL under the relevant gas purchase agreements.
On appeal Transco first contended that Transco's failure to act in good
faith in setting the market-out price for gas purchased did not entitle ANPC
and OIL to actual damages. In a per curiam opinion, the Texarkana court
of appeals agreed, holding that the remedy expressly provided for in the Ver-
milion gas purchase contract allowing sellers to release the gas from the con-
tract was the exclusive remedy for ANPC and OIL if they were dissatisfied
with the market-out price.15 - The exclusive contractual remedy excluded
ANPC and OIL from receiving the jury award of $637,900 for Transco's
failure to use good faith in exercising the market-out right. 156
Transco next claimed that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's
findings as to the amount of damages for Transco's failure to purchase the
contractual minimum quantities of gas. Transco did not complain of the
jury's findings with respect to the Vermilion contract of $348,211 for failure
to purchase monthly minimum quantities and $352,875 for failure to
purchase annual minimum quantities. The trial court, in granting the judg-
ment n.o.v. and increasing the award of damages for such breaches, based its
calculation of damages on the original contract price of gas rather than the
market-out price. The appellate court found this an error because the par-
ties amended the original contract to provide for market-out prices in the
absence of ANPC and OIL exercising their sole remedy.15 7 Since ANPC
and OIL failed to exercise their exclusive contractual remedy, any damage
calculation for failure to take minimum quantities must be based on the mar-
ket-out price elected by Transco.158
Transco also claimed that the $16 million punitive damages award was
improper. The appellate court agreed, noting that exemplary damages are
not recoverable for a mere breach of contract. 59 By analogy to the relation-
ship between a lessor and lessee under an oil and gas lease, the court found
that the Vermilion contract was "accompanied by implied covenants to act
in good faith in determining the market-out price and in performing the con-
tract .... ."160 A breach of such covenant, therefore, would be contractual
and would not support an award of exemplary damages absent the finding of
an independent tort and resulting actual damages. 61
The jury did find that Transco tortiously interfered with the gas balancing
agreements. Nevertheless, ANPC and OIL failed to secure a jury finding as
155. 763 S.W.2d at 817-18.
156. Id
157. Id. at 818.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 819.
160. Id. at 820.
161. Id
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to the specific amount of actual damages caused by such tortious interfer-
ence. According to the appellate court, the mere finding of an independent
tort without a finding of the amount of damages resulting from such tort
would not support an award of exemplary damages. 162 The trial court,
therefore, erred in awarding such exemplary damages. 163
ANPC and OIL argued that the measure of damages for tortious interfer-
ence with a contract equaled the measure of damages for a breach of the
contract. They claimed that the damages found by the jury for breach of the
Vermilion contract was the same as the actual damages for tortious interfer-
ence with a contract. The court of appeals, however, pointed out that the
claims involved two different contracts: the damages found by the jury for
breach of contract related to the Vermilion gas purchase contract; whereas
the claim for tortious interference related to the gas balancing agree-
ments. 164 The damages under these separate theories would be different
since they related to different contracts. 165 The court concluded that ANPC
and OIL failed to present any evidence as to the existence or extent of actual
damages caused by tortious interference with the gas balancing agreement
and, consequently, the tort did not support the exemplary damage award. 166
Because Transco did not object on appeal to portions of the trial court's
judgment, the appellate court affirmed the judgment with the following mod-
ifications: (I) deletion of the $16 million exemplary damage award because
of the absence of actual damages from any independent tort; (2) deletion of
the damages awarded by the court for bad faith exercise of the market-out
right in the amount of $2,376,609 because the contract provided for a sole
remedy other than money damages; and (3) restoration of the jury findings
of $348,211 for damages due to Transco's failure to purchase required
monthly quantities, and $352,875 for Transco's failure to take or pay for
required annual minimum quantities of gas.167
In Edwards v. Lone Star Gas Company,168 the Texas Supreme Court con-
strued the provisions of a price redetermination clause contained in two gas
purchase agreements to include in the redetermined price any monthly price
escalations authorized and charged under other comparable contracts, but to
exclude amounts allocable to severance tax reimbursement.' 69 Edwards, the
gas producer, sued Lone Star Gas Company, the pipeline, alleging that Lone
Star had breached the provisions of two gas purchase contracts by failing to
pay monthly price escalations as part of a redetermined contract price, and
by failing to reimburse Edwards for state severance taxes.' 70
162. Id
163. Id
164. Id at 821.
165. Id
166. Id at 822.
167. Id. at 826-27.
168. 782 S.W.2d 840 (rex. 1990).
169. Id. at 840-842.
170. The price redetermination provisions of each contract provided for annual price rede-
termination as follows:
It is agreed that the redetermined price per MMBtu for such gas shall be equal
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The contracts at issue were subject to section 105 of the NGPA,171 which
imposed price ceilings on the sale of intrastate gas, but authorized the FERC
to adjust the price ceiling each month for inflation. In 1980, and each year
thereafter, Edwards requested that the price under the Edwards-Lone Star
contracts be redetermined by reference to other contracts in which the price
incorporated the monthly inflation adjustments. Lone Star refused to in-
clude the monthly inflation adjustments as a part of the redetermined price,
and instead paid Edwards a flat rate equal to the dollar amount that was
actually paid under the referenced contracts at the time of the
redetermination.
In reviewing the issue, the supreme court found nothing in the contracts
that required the redetermined price, to be construed as a flat rate or prohib-
ited a fluctuating price on a monthly basis.' 72 Instead, the court found that
the parties agreed that price redeterminations would be made by reference to
the highest price in third-party contracts without limitation. 73 On this ba-
sis, the court held that Edwards was entitled to the "price" as set forth in the
referenced third-party contracts and was, accordingly, entitled to receive the
monthly inflation adjustments.174
Edwards also contended that the redetermined price should include reim-
bursement for severance taxes because one of the referenced third-party con-
tracts included a severance tax reimbursement provision. The court,
however, held that to construe the price redetermination provision under the
Edwards-Lone Star contract to allow for such a tax reimbursement would be
contrary to the plain language of other provisions in the contract.175 Under
those provisions the parties expressly agreed that Edwards would pay all
taxes, including state severance taxes, and that Lone Star would reimburse
Edwards only for new or increased taxes that were imposed after the execu-
tion of the contracts. Accordingly, the court held that under the express
terms of the contracts at issue, Edwards was not entitled to any reimburse-
ment of severance taxes, so long as those taxes were at or below the rate
levied at the time the contracts were executed.176
Mid Plains Reeves, Inc. v. Farmland Industries, Inc. 177 required the con-
struction of a gas purchase contract, as amended by two letter agreements.
In 1975, Farmland Industries entered into a contract with Lone Star Gas
Company to provide up to 55 MMCF of natural gas per day. By 1986
to the highest price per MMBtu to be paid as of the first day of the period for
which the redetermined price will be effective by a bona fide intrastate pipeline
company for gas produced in Railroad Commission Districts 8 and 8A in the
State of Texas under the terms of a contract of at least three (3) year term in
effect at the time the redetermined price is to become effective....
Id. at 840-841 (emphasis omitted).
171. National Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3312 (1988).




176. Id. at 842.
177. 768 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
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Farmland was only able to supply 40 MMCF of gas and it sought to obtain
additional gas to sell to Lone Star under the 1975 contract. On May 15,
1987, Farmland entered into a gas purchase contract with Mid Plains
whereby Farmland agreed to purchase 15 MMCF of gas per day.
By letter dated May 19, 1987, Farmland wrote to Mid Plains to clarify the
May 15, 1987, agreement."78 Both Farmland and Mid Plains indicated their
approval of the May 19, 1987, letter. Mid Plains sent an additional letter of
clarification to Farmland dated June 17, 1987.179 An officer of Farmland
signed the bottom of the June 17, 1987, letter indicating the acceptance of
the terms of that letter.
When the additional 15 MMCF of gas was supplied to Lone Star, Lone
Star refused to accept delivery. Mid Plains sued Farmland and Enerfin, Inc.,
which had purchased the Farmland operations and also sold gas to Lone
Star. Mid Plains contended that Farmland breached its gas purchase agree-
ment and fraudulently made misrepresentations about enforcing its agree-
ment with Lone Star. Mid Plains further claimed that Enerfin tortiously
interfered with the business relationship by persuading Farmland to disre-
gard its contractual obligation to purchase gas from Mid Plains. The trial
court granted a summary judgment denying recovery to Mid Plains.
Mid Plains argued on appeal that the trial court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment because there were material issues of fact as to each of Mid
Plains' causes of action. With respect to Mid Plains' claim for breach of
contract, both parties agreed that the contract and supplemental letters must
be construed as one instrument, and that the contract as a whole was unam-
biguous. The parties, however, disagreed as to the correct interpretation of
the contract. Farmland claimed that the letter of May 19, 1987, conditioned
its obligatiohis to buy gas from Mid Plains upon full and complete perform-
ance by Lone Star Gas. Since Lone Star did not purchase 55 MMCF of gas
per day, Farmland claimed it had no obligation to purchase gas from Mid
Plains. Mid Plains, on the other hand, claimed the correspondence of June
17, 1987, limited Farmland's release from its obligation to purchase gas only
178. The May 19, 1987, letter provided:
Farmland's performance under the captioned contract is dependent upon full
and complete performance by Lone Star Gas Company under that certain resi-
due contract dated August 29, 1975 between Farmland and Lone Star.
In the event that Lone Star does not perform in accordance with the terms
and provisions of the August 29, 1975 contract, the rights and obligations under
the captioned May 15, 1987 contract between the parties hereto, shall be
suspended.
Id. at 320.
179. The June 17, 1987, letter provided:
I have signed your letter dated May 19, 1987 and Mid Plains understands that
the above referenced contract is negated should Lone Star Gas Company refuse
to accept any volume of gas from Farmland. However, should Lone Star accept
15 MMCF per day or any lesser volume, then the rights of Mid Plains under the
above referenced Gas Purchase Agreement will prevail.
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if Lone Star did not accept any gas from Farmland. Since Lone Star bought
some gas, Mid Plains claimed its contract should be enforced.
The trial court appeared to have adopted Farmland's interpretation of the
contract, and apparently found that no material issues remained regarding
the interpretation of the June 17, 1987, letter. The court of appeals, how-
ever, sided with the interpretation of the contract urged by Mid Plains,
holding that "[t]he last modification supersedes and controls any prior con-
flicting provision and makes Farmland obligated to buy under its contract
with Mid Plains if it sells any volume of gas to Lone Star."' 80
With respect to its claim for fraud, Mid Plains contended that a represen-
tative of Farmland promised that Farmland would sue Lone Star to enforce
the 1975 contract if Lone Star did not purchase the gas that Mid Plains
furnished to Farmland. Indeed, a representative of Farmland conceded that
he did make such a statement. The court of appeals found that this evidence
raised a fact issue regarding whether, at the time the promise was made, the
promisor had the present intention to perform.' 8 ' Finally, as to Mid Plains'
claim for tortious interference with a business relationship, the appellate
court found that Farmland's affidavit in support of its motion for summary
judgment did not establish as a matter of law that at least one element of the
plaintiff's cause of action did not exist.'8 2 The El Paso court of appeals,
therefore, reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause
for a new trial.183
IV. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. Gas Rights versus Oil Rights
The Texas Supreme Court considered the relative rights of gas rights own-
ers and oil rights owners with regard to production from the Panhandle field
in Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-A gri Products, Inc. 18 4 Jewel Kimberlin and
H.D. Howse owned an interest in the relevant tract of land under a 1952 oil
and gas lease, and relevant assignment. That same year, Howse and Kim-
berlin drilled and completed a producing gas well on the tract in the Brown
Dolomite Formation. The following year, Howse and Kimberlin assigned to
Amarillo Oil's predecessor in interest the producing gas well and the gas
rights under the lease, reserving all of the oil and casinghead gas rights.
Amarillo Oil eventually aquired these gas rights. Pursuant to a farmout
agreement in 1981, Energy-Agri acquired all of the oil and casinghead gas
rights in the tract. In 1982 Energy-Agri drilled and completed the Kimber-
lin No. 2 oil well in the Granite Formation in the tract. This well produced
180. Id. at 321 (following WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 624 (3d ed. 1961)).
181. Id. at 322.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 323.
184. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 252 (Mar. 8, 1989). After this material had been submitted to the
publisher, the Texas Supreme Court, on motion for rehearing, withdrew the reported opinion
and substituted a new opinion and judgment. See Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-Agri Products,
Inc., 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 623 (June 27, 1990).
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very small amounts of crude oil and casinghead gas, and almost no natural
gas. Energy-Agri later perforated the casing opposite the Brown Dolomite
Formation, and began producing approximately 375 MCF of gas per day
from the formation. Energy-Agri then drilled and completed another well
on the lease, intending to perforate it as it had the Kimberlin No. 2 well.
Amarillo Oil brought suit against Energy-Agri, seeking to enjoin Energy-
Agri from producing gas from the Brown Dolomite Formation, to quiet title
to all of the gas in the Brown Dolomite Formation, and to recover damages
for the conversion of gas produced by Energy-Agri. The trial court rendered
a take-nothing judgment for Amarillo Oil based on the jury verdict, which
involved classification of the relevant wells. Issues of title dispute Were not
presented to the jury. Upon appeal by Amarillo Oil, the appellate court
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, stating that Amarillo Oil's law-
suit was an impermissible collateral attack on matters exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Texas Railroad Commission.18 5
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, rejecting
Energy-Agri's assertion that the lawsuit was solely one for classification of
oil and gas wells. 86 Energy-Agri contended that the classification of a well
determined ownership of production. According to this argument, any sub-
stance produced from a well the Texas Railroad Commission classified as an
oil well belonged to the oil rights owner. Since classification of a well is a
matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission, En-
ergy-Agri therefore contended that Amarillo Oil's lawsuit collaterally at-
tacked the Commission's classification. Amarillo Oil, on the other hand,
argued that the real focus of the lawsuit involved ownership of the sub-
stances being produced, rather than the classification of the well. It denied
challenging the Commission's well classifications.
The supreme court agreed, finding that the tenor of the lawsuit was one
involving title to land and property rights 187 Noting that the Commission
has no authority to determine such issues, the supreme court found that
Amarillo Oil's lawsuit was properly before the courts.' 88 The Railroad
Commission's classification of the Kimberlin wells as oil wells did not entitle
Energy-Agri to all of the gas produced from such wells; rather, it merely
meant that the well produced at least one barrel of crude oil for each 100,000
cubic feet of natural gas.189
The supreme court then turned to the merits of Amarillo Oil's appeal.
The court first focused on the term "casinghead gas," and the fact that
Amarillo Oil's assignment was subject to a reservation of oil and casinghead
gas rights. 190 Energy-Agri claimed that the term casinghead gas meant all
of the gas produced from an oil well, as a matter of law. Amarillo Oil, on
185. 731 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987), rev'd, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 252 (Mar. 8,
1989).




190. Id at 255.
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the other hand, asserted that Energy-Agri's interpretation was inconsistent
with the statutory definition of casinghead gas existing at the time of the
conveyance and incorrect when examined in the context of the conveyances
in the parties' chain of title.
The 1953 statutory definition of casinghead gas was "any gas and/or va-
por indigenous to an oil stratum and produced from such stratum with
oil."191 The supreme court found that the statutory definition was inconsis-
tent with the interpretation asserted by Energy-Agri. 192 Additionally, the
court found Energy-Agri's argument that Howse and Kimberlin intended to
reserve all gas produced from oil wells unlikely and unjust and resulting in
illogical consequences. 193
Energy-Agri's argument assumed that Howse and Kimberlin intended to
convey nonexclusive rights to compete for the same substance. The supreme
court noted, "lilt would mean that the parties intended to compete for gas
production under circumstances overwhelmingly weighted in favor of the oil
and casinghead gas owner," because applicable spacing rules allow only one
gas well per 640 acres, whereas the rules provide ten-acre spacing for oil
wells. 194 Applicable rules, furthermore, permitted the oil rights owner to
drill as close to an existing gas well as it desired. 195
The supreme court found a separate reason why Energy-Agri's claim to
the gas produced from its oil wells must fail. The Texas Natural Resources
Code provides that "[n]o person in possession of or operating an oil well
may produce from the oil well gas found in a horizon productive of gas
only."' 196 The Brown Dolomite Formation under the tract contains gas
only.
The supreme court then held that Energy-Agri owned, as a matter of law,
only the rights to oil and casinghead gas as defined by statute.1 97 The
supreme court found that Energy-Agri had no right to produce gas from the
Brown Dolomite Formation, and it remanded the cause to the trial court for
determination of the damages incurred by Amarillo Oil for gas converted by
Energy-Agri. 198
The court's opinion assumes added importance because in dictum the
191. Act of Apr. 26, 1935, ch. 120, § 2(i), 1935 Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 318, 319, repealed
by Natural Resources Code, ch. 871, art. I, sec. 2(a)(2), 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2345, 2689
(currently codified as amended at Tax. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 86.002(10) (Vernon 1978)).
192. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 255.
193. Id. at 256.
194. Id
195. Id.
196. TEx. NAT. Rns. CODE ANN. § 86.097 (Vernon 1978).
197. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 257. In the words of the court:
When oil rights are severed from gas rights in a phase severance, and the parties
make no attempt in the conveying instrument to do otherwise, the party who
owns the rights to casinghead gas owns only that gas or vapor which is indige-
nous to an oil stratum and is produced from that stratum along with oil, as
contrasted to gas produced from a separate gas stratum through an oil well, le.,
a well with its bore bottomed in an oil producing stratum. To hold otherwise
would be to render meaningless the rights of those who own gas rights.
Id.
198. Id. at 257-58.
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court noted that its reasoning in this case was also applicable to "white oil"
cases.199 The court stated that "[w]hether gas is produced by perforating the
well casing in gas-indigenous formations, or by liquid recovery units that
turn the gas into liquid form, those who do not own the gas rights produce
gas in violation of the rights of the owner. ' 2 o
The Amarillo court of appeals considered a similar issue in Jinkins v.
Bryan,201 which involved interpretation of the statutory definition of dry
gas.202 Jinkins and Amarala Petroleum, Inc. owned an undivided one-sixth
of an 81.25% working interest in only the dry gas under a certain tract of
land. Damson Oil Corporation enjoyed a one-sixteenth overriding royalty of
eight-eighths of the dry gas in the tract. Bryan owned the remaining rights
to the oil, casinghead gas, and dry gas under the tract in question.
The relevant tract had four producing wells. The Herber No. I oil well,
the Herber No. 3 oil well, and the Herber No. 5 oil well were perforated and
fractured throughout the Brown Dolomite Formation and in the Granite
Wash Formation. The Herber No. 1 gas well was perforated and fractured
only in the top of the Brown Dolomite Formation. The gas well produced
gas only; however, the Herber No. 1, No. 3, and No. 5 oil wells produced
both gas and oil. Bryan based royalty payments to Damson and payments of
proceeds to Jinkins and Amarala solely on gas production from the Herber
No. 1 gas well. Bryan did not consider the gas produced from the Herber
No. 1, No. 3, and No. 5 oil wells to be dry gas, but rather casinghead gas.
Jinkins, Amarala, and Damson disagreed. They filed suit against Bryan to
recover damages for conversion of their gas and to have their title to gas
quieted. The plaintiffs claimed that the Brown Dolomite Formation con-
tained both gas and oil and that all gas in the formation above the gas-oil
contact was dry gas. Bryan counterclaimed, seeking recovery of payments
previously made for production from the Herber No. 1 gas well. Bryan as-
serted that, according to the statutory definition of dry gas, the gas produced
from the Brown Dolomite Formation was not dry gas because the formation
also produced oil. Granting Bryan's motion for summary judgment, the
trial court rendered judgment that Jinkins, Amarala, and Damson take
199. The court stated:
The legal controversies currently existing in the Panhandle Field involve two
practices engaged in by oil operators. One is the high perforations practice. Oil
operators have been shooting perforations in the well casings in the gas forma-
tion of oil wells, higher up in the hole. The second practice is known as produc-
ing white oil, which is accomplished by condensing gas into liquids by using low
temperature extraction (LTX) units. The instant case presents the high perfora-
tions practice, by which Energy-Agri has converted Amarillo Oil's natural gas.
While the parties in this case do not complain of the practice of producing white
oil, we note that the same legal issues that we resolve today would be presented
if oil operators liquified natural gas, other than casinghead gas as defined by
statute, to defeat the rights of the gas owners.
Id at 257 n.2 (citation omitted).
200. Id at 257 (footnote omitted).
201.. 763 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
202. "Dry gas" is "gas produced from a stratum that does not produce oil." Tax. NAT.
Ran. CODE ANN. § 86.002(7) (Vernon 1978).
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nothing in their action against Bryan, and the court severed Bryan's
counterclaim.
On appeal the issue was "whether the evidence produced, under the strin-
gent summary judgment tests, is sufficient to establish that gas being pro-
duced from this tract is not dry gas within the purview of the statute. '20 3
Bryan claimed that his summary judgment proof established that the wells
produced oil from the Brown Dolomite Formation under the tract in ques-
tion, and, therefore, the gas produced from such formation was not dry gas
as a matter of law.
Jinkins, et al., on the other hand, claimed that Bryan presented insufficient
evidence to meet the summary judgment tests regarding the production of
oil from the Brown Dolomite Formation. Jinkins further asserted that, even
if the summary judgment evidence showed that oil was being produced from
the Brown Dolomite Formation, evidence did not negate the possibility that
gas produced from the Brown Dolomite Formation could be dry gas.
Jinkins claimed that the term "stratum," as used in the statute, did not nec-
essarily include the entire Brown Dolomite Formation. In effect, Jinkins
argued that the portion of the formation above the gas-oil contact consti-
tuted one stratum, and the remaining portion of the formation below the
gas-oil contact constituted another stratum.
The Amarillo court of appeals found merit in Jinkins argument. Consid-
ering the remainder of the relevant code provision,204 the court noted that
Texas recognizes only two generic types of natural gas--dry gas and casing-
head gas.205 The court concluded that the legislature intended dry gas to
include all gas not indigenous to an oil stratum and not produced from that
stratum with oil.206 The court then held that separate producing horizons
are possible within a single formation.207 In order to determine the classifi-
cation of gas produced from a well, therefore, the factfinder must determine
which horizon produced the gas, and the amount of corresponding oil pro-
duced from that same horizon. 208 The appellate court found that Bryan
failed to meet the summary judgment burden of proof in this regard.209 The
court also found error on the part of the trial court in severing Bryan's coun-
terclaim for royalties previously paid for dry gas that he claimed were not
actually due. 210 The court, therefore, reversed and remanded for trial on the
203. 763 S.W.2d at 545.
204. TEx. NAT. Rns. CODE ANN. § 86.002 (Vernon 1978).
205. 763 S.W.2d at 546.
206. Id. According to the court:
A "stratum" which is producing oil within the purview of section 86.002(7) is a
producing horizon producing more than one barrel of oil to each 100,000 cubic
feet of gas. Gas produced from such a horizon would be "casinghead gas"
within the statutory purview. Contrariwise, gas produced from a horizon pro-
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merits. 211
Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Ina v. Maxus Exploration Co. 212 concerned an ac-
tion originally brought by the owner of the gas rights against the owner of
the oil and casinghead gas rights for conversion of gas well gas. Maxus
owned the rights to the gas well gas under a certain tract of land in Moore
County, Texas, pursuant to a 1938 gas mining lease. The lease specifically
excluded all of the oil and casinghead gas. In 1938 Maxus's predecessor in
interest drilled and completed the Coffee H-1 Well on the lease, which has
continuously produced gas since that time. The well was completed
throughout the Brown Dolomite and Moore County Lime Formations.
In 1983, through a farmout arrangement, Raw Hide acquired all oil and
casinghead gas rights under the relevant lease. Raw Hide drilled four wells
on the lease in 1984. All four such wells were completed in the Brown Dolo-
mite and Moore County Lime Formations, the same formations from which
the Coffee H-1 Well had produced gas since 1938. In 1985 Raw Hide drilled
and completed another well in the Brown Dolomite and Moore County
Lime Formations. In that same year, Raw Hide drilled four more wells on
the lease. Each of these four additional wells was perforated and fractured
in the Arkosic Dolomite formation, immediately below the Moore County
Lime Formation. The perforations in these four wells were only a few feet
from the bottom of the Moore County Lime Formation, and some evidence
indicated that the fractures could have extended up into the Moore County
Lime Formation.
Subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, the parties entered an agreed test-
ing order. The order permitted Maxus to conduct tests and measure gas
flow from the Raw Hide wells, which Raw Hide would operate during the
testing period. The average amount of oil produced during the period was
0.049 barrels per day per well. Average gas production during the same time
was 225 MCF per day per well. During sixteen days of the twenty-eight-day
test period, the Raw Hide wells produced no oil whatsoever.
At trial Raw Hide disputed the test results and claimed that the gathering
system designed and installed by Maxus prevented oil production from the
wells. In response to special issues, the jury found the Raw Hide wells capa-
ble of producing gas belonging to the owner of the gas rights, and that Raw
Hide produced such gas. The jury further found that the Brown Dolomite,
the Moore County Lime, and other formations under the lease did not con-
tain oil and that 100% of the gas produced during the test period was dry
gas rather than casinghead gas. With respect to Raw Hide's counterclaim,
the jury found that Maxus did not convert any oil or casinghead gas from
the lease. In accordance with the jury verdict, the trial court entered judg-
ment decreeing that Maxus owned the exclusive and sole right to complete
wells in and produce gas from the Brown Dolomite, the Moore County
Lime, and certain other formations under the lease. The court then perma-
nently enjoined Raw Hide from producing any gas from the formations.
211. Id at 547.
212. 766 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Axnarillo 1988, writ denied).
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Raw Hide appealed, asserting eleven points of error. The first point con-
sidered by the appellate court presented a jurisdictional attack. Raw Hide
claimed that the judgment of the trial court amounted to a collateral attack
on the Texas Railroad Commission's classification of the Raw Hide Fate
wells as "oil wells." The court of appeals disagreed, instead finding that the
trial court properly had jurisdiction since Maxus' cause of action was one to
establish the ownership of and title to gas produced from formations under
the Fate lease.213
By another point of error, Raw Hide contended that the trial court gave
an improper definition of the term "oil" in one of the special issues submit-
ted to the jury.214 Raw Hide argued that the instruction was too restrictive
because it required the jury to determine whether the formation could pro-
duce any oil under normal operating conditions. Raw Hide, instead, sought
the statutory definition of oil as "crude petroleum oil, crude petroleum, and
crude oil," or "crude petroleum oil.,,215 Raw Hide claimed that the exist-
ence of any oil was a critical issue regardless of whether the oil was produci-
ble under normal operating conditions. Noting that a similar jury
instruction survived attack in Dorchester Gas Producing Co. v. Harlow
Corp.,216 the court found that the instruction was proper. The 1938 gas
lease expressly incorporated the 1938 statutory definition of casinghead gas
which was "any gas and/or vapor indigenous to an oil stratum and produced
from such stratum with oil."217 Thus, the issue of whether oil in the forma-
tion was producible was relevant to the determination of whether gas from
such formation constituted casinghead gas rather than dry gas.218 Raw
Hide raised other points of error on appeal not relevant to oil, gas, and min-
eral law. The court of appeals overruled each such point219 and, accord-
ingly, affirmed the trial court's judgment.220
213. Id. at 269-70.
214. The relevant special issue provided as follows:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 7
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that oil exists in any of the
following formations under the Raw Hide Fate lease?




Moore County Lime above 347 feet above sea level...
Below 347 feet above sea level...
You are instructed that the word "oil" means crude petroleum oil, that is liquid
both in the reservoir and at the surface, that is native to the reservoir and that is
producible under normal operating conditions.
Id. at 271.
215. See TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.001(b), 86.002(1) (Vernon 1978).
216. 743 S.W.2d 243, 257 (Tex. App.-Amarllo 1987, writ denied).
217. Act of Apr. 26, 1935, ch. 120, § 2(i), 1935 Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 318, 319, (repealed
1977) (currently codified as amended at TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.002(10) (Vernon
1978)).
218. 766 S.W.2d at 272.
219. Id. at 272-80.
220. Id at 280.
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B. Various Agreements
In Cambridge Oil Co. v. Huggins221 the Corpus Christi court of appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff Huggins that ordered
rescission, termination, and cancellation of a farmout agreement and partial
assignments of interest made thereunder and awarded Huggins $100,000 ac-
tual damages for gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and
$1,500,000 in punitive damages. 22 The appellate court then rendered judg-
ment for Cambridge.223 In 1983 Huggins sold the relevant tract to Thomas
O'Connor, reserving one-half of the royalty interest in the oil, gas, and min-
erals. Later that same year, O'Connor executed an oil and gas lease in favor
of GSI, Inc. In early 1985, GSI entered into a farmout agreement with
Cambridge Oil Company. Pursuant to that agreement, Cambridge com-
pleted four producing wells, and GSI made four partial assignments to
Cambridge.
The farmout agreement contained a continuous development clause that
required Cambridge to commence operations for the drilling of a well within
120 days from the completion of a producing well or the drilling of a dry
hole. Several times during the term of the farmout agreement, Cambridge
requested and received extensions of time to fulfill its development obliga-
tions. In September 1986, Cambridge sought another extension. At that
time, Cambridge was six months behind in the payment of monies due under
the agreement. Huggins, O'Connor, and GSI granted Cambridge's request
for extension; however, as a condition to such extension, Cambridge prom-
ised to make disbursements on a timely basis.2 Cambridge failed to com-
mence operations for the drilling of a well during the extended time period
and, as a result, Cambridge lost its right to drill on any other portion of the
property.
Huggins brought suit against Cambridge, seeking rescission of the
farmout agreement and cancellation of assignments previously made to
Cambridge under the farmout agreement. Huggins also sought damages
from Cambridge, asserting that the failure to timely pay royalties constituted
gross negligence and a breach of fiduciary duty that purportedly arose from
the September 1986 amendment wherein Cambridge promised in writing to
timely disburse future royalty payments.
Regarding Huggins' claim for rescission based on the terms of the Septem-
ber 1986 amendment, the court of appeals framed the relevant issue as being
"whether the failure to pay royalties due under the farmout agreement ter-
221. 765 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
222. IA at 542.
223. Id at 545.
224. The September 1986 amendment provided:
You (Cambridge) represent and warrant that you shall in the future disburse all
proceeds due us (Huggins and GSI) and the lessors (O'Connors) under the lease
which is the subject of the agreement on a continuing, regular, and monthly
basis and, in the event you do not disburse such proceeds then we shall at our
sole option: a) exercise the rights to obtain all proceeds due us from the pur-




minated the extension agreement of September 1986; or whether the failure
to pay royalties cancelled the entire farmout agreement, including the previ-
ously assigned interest that Cambridge had already earned."22 The jury
found that such failure to pay caused a termination of the entire farmout
agreement and a cancellation of the prior partial assignments.
The Corpus Christi court of appeals, however, found that the contract was
unambiguous as a matter of law and, therefore, the jury finding was immate-
rial.226 The appellate court then held that the trial court erred in rendering
judgment that the failure of Cambridge to pay royalties terminated the par-
tial assignments.227 The court examined the original farmout agreement and
the subsequent amendments. No provision of the agreement, as amended,
permitted cancellation of the previous partial assignments for failure to pay
royalties. 228 Indeed, several provisions of the farmout agreement that dealt
with termination of the agreement due to failure to timely commence drilling
operations recognized the continuing effect of any previous partial assign-
ment of interest under the terms of the agreement.229
As to the trial court's judgment regarding breach of fiduciary duty, the
appellate court found no evidence of the existence of a fiduciary duty.230
Huggins claimed that the extensions allowing Cambridge to continue drill-
ing changed the relationship of the parties from a mere contractual relation-
ship to one of confidentiality. The appellate court noted, however, that the
evidence indicated just the opposite.231 The September 1986 amendment,
for example, illustrated the lack of a relationship of trust and confidence
between the parties.232 In the absence of evidence of the existence or breach
of fiduciary duty, the court of appeals found no basis for the award of $1
million in exemplary damages based upon such breach.233
Huggins' claim for gross negligence rested on the fact that Cambridge
failed to pay royalties even after being paid by the gas purchaser. According
to the court of appeals, however, the claim related totally to the contractual
relationship between the parties under the farmout agreement. 234 Reasoning
that a breach of contract does not entitle an injured party to exemplary dam-
ages, even if the breach is intentional, the appellate court found that the trial
225. Id at 543.
226. Id at 544.
227. Id
228. Id at 543-44.
229. Paragraph 11 of the farmout agreement, for example, provided in part:
[I]f the operations specified are not commenced by the commencement dates
and diligently pursued in a manner herein provided, or if you have not complied
with each and all of the terms and provisions of this agreement, Farmor shall be
relieved of any and all obligations to make the assignment(s) herein specified or
any part thereof, except for acreage already earned according to the terms of this
agreement, and the agreement shall terminate.
Id. at 543-44 (emphasis by the court).
230. Id at 544-45.
231. Id
232. Id. at 544.
233. Id at 545.
234. Id.
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court erred in awarding $500,000 in exemplary damages for gross negli-
gence, because Huggins failed to prove any distinct tort.23s
The dispute in Brown v. Welltech, Inc. 6 arose out of an unsuccessful
deepening operation. In 1981, Brown, an independent oil operator, engaged
Welltech, a drilling contractor, to re-enter and deepen a well in New Mex-
ico. Brown and Welltech entered into an oral agreement whereby Weltech
agreed to furnish the rig, certain equipment, and the crew to drill the well
700 feet deeper at a certain price per day for the first five days, and thereaf-
ter, at a slightly reduced price per day. Seven days after the Welltech crew
began work on the project, a mishap occurred. While the crew pulled the
drill pipe out of the hole, the elevators holding the drill pipe opened and the
drill string fell back into the hole. Fishing attempts were unsuccessful, and
the well was ultimately lost because of materials remaining in the hole.
Brown refused to pay Welltech for its services and engaged another com-
pany to drill a replacement well.
Brown sued Welltech to recover damages arising out of the loss of the oil
and gas well and for the drilling of the replacement well on theories of negli-
gence, breach of express and implied warranties, deceptive trade practices,
and others. Welltech counterclaimed against Brown for payment under the
oral agreement based on allegations of a sworn account for goods and mater-
ials sold and delivered to Brown. Pursuant to jury findings, the trial court
rendered judgment denying Brown any recovery on his claims, but awarding
Welltech more than $150,000 for its action on sworn account.
Brown appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in rendering a take-
nothing judgment against him on the grounds that the evidence conclusively
established that Weltech breached the drilling contract and caused harm to
Brown. Brown also claimed that the trial court erred in entering a judgment
in favor of Welltech on its claim since Weltech failed to request any jury
issues regarding sworn account. Weltech countered that the take-nothing
judgment for Brown was proper since Brown failed to plead breach of con-
tract or request any jury issues on that theory of recovery. Welltech also
asserted that the judgment for Welltech was proper even in the absence of
jury findings because the evidence conclusively established its right to re-
cover on sworn account.
The appellate court noted that the failure to request a special issue neces-
sary to support an independent theory of recovery provided no grounds for a
favorable judgment on that theory. The failure further left nothing for ap-
pellate review, unless the evidence conclusively, proved a theory of recovery
as a matter of law.237 Since both parties claimed that the evidence conclu-
sively established their respective theories of recovery, the court examined
all of the evidence to determine whether either party proved its position as a
matter of law.238 One issue common to both parties' theory of recovery con-
235. Id
236. 769 S.W.2d 637 (rex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).




cerned the nature of the agreement between the parties.
Some evidence indicated that the contract was on a turnkey basis,
whereby the drilling contractor retained sole responsibility for the job.
Other evidence indicated that the contract was for day work, whereby the
operator bore responsibility for losses of the sort incurred.
Brown contended that Welltech contracted to complete the 700-foot drill-
ing job on a turnkey basis. According to this interpretation, Brown could
recover from Welltech for the loss incurred during drilling operations, and
Welltech could not recover on its claim for sworn account because it
breached the contract by failing to reach the planned total depth. Welltech,
on the other hand, claimed that it contracted merely to provide drilling serv-
ices on a daily basis and, therefore, Brown retained responsibility for losses
during drilling. Additionally, according to Welltech's interpretation, Brown
owed Welltech for drilling services provided to Brown for a certain number
of days.
After examining the evidence regarding the classification of the oral agree-
ment at hand, the court concluded that ordinary or reasonable minds could
differ as to the nature of the agreement. 239 The conflicting evidence of the
classification of the contract raised a fact issue.2 ° Since both parties to the
lawsuit sought affirmative relief dependent upon the resolution of a factual
issue, either or both should have requested that the trial court submit an
appropriate special issue to the jury.241 The failure by the parties to do so
constituted a waiver of their respective grounds of recovery not conclusively
established by the evidence.242 Neither Brown nor Welltech conclusively
established their respective theories of recovery.2 3 The court of appeals,
therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment for Welltech on its counter-
claim, and rendered judgment that Welltech and Brown both take
nothing.244
Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co.245 involved the determination of whether
two provisions in a joint operating agreement regarding notice of plugging
and abandoning and notice of surrender of lease implied a duty on the part
of the operator to notify the nonoperator of impending lease termination.
Fuller and Phillips were parties to a 1964 joint operating agreement covering
operations of oil and casinghead gas leases on a unit area. Phillips owned
two leases within the area, and Fuller owned one lease. In accordance with
the operating agreement, Phillips, as operator, drilled a well in 1964 within
the unit area. This well produced oil from 1964 until January 12, 1983,
when it ceased production. On or about March 13, 1983, Phillips' two leases
within the unit area terminated by their express terms because of cessation of
production for more than sixty days. In April 1983, Phillips notified Fuller





244. Id at 641.
245. 872 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1989).
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of its intent to plug and abandon the well, which it did despite Fuller's
objections.
Fuller then brought suit against Phillips, claiming Phillips had breached
the joint operating agreement by failing to notify Fuller of its intent to plug
and abandon the well before the expiration of Phillips' two leases. Phillips
counterclaimed, seeking damages from Fuller for his breach of the joint op-
erating agreement by his failure to pay his proportionate share of the operat-
ing expenses. Despite a jury verdict favorable to Fuller on his claim and
favorable to Phillips on its counterclaim, the district court granted the sepa-
rate motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict filed by Phillips and
Fuller, thereby rendering judgment that neither party was liable to the other.
Fuller appealed, claiming that the district court erred in concluding, as a
matter of law, that Phillips did not breach the joint operating agreement by
failing to notify Fuller of its intent to plug and abandon the well prior to
termination of Phillips' two leases. More specifically, Fuller contended that
Phillips breached the operating agreement by failing to notify him that both
of Phillips' leases would expire at the end of sixty days following the date on
which production from the well ceased. Although the joint operating agree-
ment contained no express provision obligating the operator to notify the
nonoperator of impending lease termination, Fuller argued that the court
should imply such a duty by virtue of two other provisions in the
contract.24"
The district court found that the notice of plugging provision imposed no
duty on Phillips to notify Fuller of its intent to plug and abandon the well
prior to the expiration of the underlying leases. The Fifth Circuit agreed. 247
Article 16 required notice only of the abandoning party's intent to plug and
abandon a well, not notice by that party of an impending lease termina-
tion.248 To bolster this interpretation, the court pointed to other provisions
in the operating agreement that directly addressed the possibility of the expi-
ration or loss of a lease.249 Since Phillips did notify Fuller of its intent to
plug and abandon the well in accordance with the terms of article 16, albeit
after termination of the two leases, Phillips did not breach the article.250
246. Article 16 of the joint operating agreement provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
No well... shall be plugged and abandoned without the consent of all parties;
provided, however, if all parties do not agree to the abandonment of any well,
those wishing to continue its operation shall tender to each of the other parties
its proportionate share of the value of the well's salvable material and equipment
... ,less the estimated cost of salvaging and the estimated cost ot plugging and
abandoning.
Id at 658 (emphasis by the court omitted). Article 23 of the operating agreement required the
consent of all parties prior to the surrender, in whole or in part, of any lease affecting the unit
area or, in the absence of such consent, the assignment of such leases to the non-consenting
parties. Id at 659.
247. Id at 659.
248. I,
249. These other provisions included Article 2.B "Failure of Title," Article 2.C "Loss of
Leases for other than Title Failure," Article 17 "Delay Rentals and Shut-in Well Payments,"
and Article 22 "Renewal or Extension of Leases." Id at 659 n.l.
250. Id. at 659.
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In support of his cause of action for breach of contract, Fuller next as-
serted that Phillips' actions in allowing the lease to terminate due to the
cessation of production constituted an affirmative surrender of the leases.
According to Fuller's argument, Phillips' failure to obtain consent before its
surrender constituted breach of article 23 of the operating agreement. In
disagreeing with this reasoning, both the district court and the court of ap-
peals noted a legal distinction between the terms surrender and
termination. 251
The term surrender, as used in the oil and gas industry, refers to the con-
tractual right of a lessee to relinquish voluntarily to the lessor all or part of
the leased premises;252 termination of a lease, as relevant to the present situ-
ation, refers to the expiration of a lease by its own terms. For example, a
lease expires because its terms require the operator to maintain production
or continuous operations on the leased premises past the end of the primary
term. 253 Since Phillips' leases expired by virtue of their own express terms,
the surrender clause contained in article 23 was inapplicable.254 The article,
therefore, did not impose a duty on Phillips to notify Fuller of the impending
termination of the leases. 255 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court.256
C. Other Issues
London v. Merriman 2 57 concerned the effect of an anti-communitization
provision contained in an oil and gas lease. London owned two adjoining
tracts of land and held the executive right to all of the minerals underlying
both tracts. London further owned a three-sixteenth royalty interest under
the eastern tract and a one-eighth royalty interest in the western tract. The
Merrimans owned a one-sixteenth nonparticipating royalty interest in the
western tract. In 1980, London executed a single oil and gas lease that cov-
ered both tracts to McCord Exploration Company. McCord subsequently
completed producing gas wells on the eastern tract in which London owned
the entire royalty interest. McCord drilled no wells on the western tract.
In 1983 the Merrimans filed a lawsuit against London and McCord,
claiming that McCord had breached its obligation to protect the western
tract from drainage caused by the production of gas from the eastern tract.
The Merrimans sought damages for their share of gas royalties lost as a
result of the claimed drainage. In 1984 the Merrimans obtained an order
from the Railroad Commission force-pooling their royalty interest with
London's, thereby enabling them to share in the royalties paid on the wells
situated on the eastern tract from and after the date of the Commission's
order. The Merrimans did not dismiss their lawsuit. Rather, in 1986 they
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 659-60.
254. Id at 660.
255. IA
256. Id.
257. 756 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
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filed an amended petition alleging, as an alternative theory of recovery, that
by instituting the lawsuit they had ratified the lease executed by London. As
a matter of law, they argued, the ratifiction caused their royalty interest to be
pooled with London's as of that date. The Merrimans prevailed in their
lawsuit on both the drainage and the ratification theories. They elected to
have judgment entered on the basis of the latter, thus recovering their share
of royalties on hydrocarbons produced and sold from the wells at issue from
the date they filed suit until the effective date of the Railroad Commission's
force-pooling order.-
On appeal London conceded that the underlying lease contained a stan-
dard pooling provision. Under ordinary circumstances, the provision would
allow nonparticipating royalty interest owners such as the Merrimans an
opportunity to ratify the lease and effect a pooling of their royalty interest
with London's. London, however, contended that in this instance the lease
contained an express anti-communitization clause that specifically negated
that result.258 On the basis of the anti-communitization provision, London
contended that the execution of the underlying lease did not constitute an
offer to the Merrimans to create a community lease by ratification. Instead,
London argued, the anti-communitization clause kept the royalties separate
so that only production, if any, from the western tract entitled the Mer-
rimans to royalties.
The court of appeals rejected London's analysis, reasoning that the pur-
ported anti-communitization clause simply provided that no pooling of roy-
alty interest occurred merely from the inclusion of the two tracts in one
lease.259 The court agreed that no pooling had resulted merely because the
lease had covered the two tracts involved, but held that pooling had resulted
from the basic pooling provision contained in the lease that authorized the
pooling of royalties coupled with the Merrimans' ratification of the lessee's
inclusion of both tracts under the single lease instrument. 26°
258. The clause at issue provided:
If this lease now or hereafter covers separate tracts, no pooling or unitization of
royalty interest as between any such separate tracts is intended or shall be im-
plied or result merely from the inclusion of such separate tracts within this lease
but Lessee shall nevertheless have the right to pool as provided above with con-
sequent allocation of production as above provided. As used in this paragraph
4, the words "separate tract" mean any tract with royalty ownership differing,
now or hereafter, either as to parties or amounts, from that as to any other part
of the leased premises.
Ili at 740.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 741. According to the court:
London's lease with McCord attempted to authorize an unauthorized act,
thereby offering the Merrimans an opportunity to ratify the lease. The Mer-
rimans accepted the offer by ratifying the lease, which the trial court found oc-
curred when suit was filed in 1983. Bringing suit constitutes an implied
ratification of an unauthorized act. By ratifying the lease, the Merrimans be-
came a party to it, and the rule that the execution of an oil and gas lease by more




The issue in Pickens v. Hope261 was whether the mineral fee owner
breached a duty to the owner of a term nonparticipating royalty interest by
failing to lease his land to another for the development and production of tar
from a deposit of tar underlying the land, or by failing to develop and pro-
duce the tar himself. Pickens owned the surface estate of the Chaney Lake
Ranch in Maverick and Zavala Counties, Texas, and the underlying miner-
als, subject to a /64th term nonparticipating royalty owned by Hope, and a
like royalty owned by Oil Field Transportation Company. These nonpartici-
pating royalty interests began on June 10, 1965, for a term of twenty years,
and continued as long thereafter as oil, gas, or other minerals were produced
from the land in paying or commercial -quantities. Neither party disputed
that the San Miguel Formation under the Ranch contained large quantities
of tar. From 1976 until 1985, several pilot plants produced tar from tracts in
the immediate vicinity of the Ranch. The plants demonstrated the technical
feasibility of producing tar; however, none was a commercial success.262 All
of the pilot plants in the area were shut down before February 1985.
Although Pickens executed two oil and gas leases that excluded the tar
sands and that resulted in a total of five dry holes being drilled on the Ranch,
he made no effort to lease the Ranch for development of the tar sands. In-
deed, the Ranch was the only tract of land in the immediate vicinity of the
four pilot plants that was not under a tar lease during the relevant period.
Pickens, however, did attempt to make arrangements with Conoco, and later
Texas Tar Sands, for the joint development of the tar under the Ranch. Co-
noco first approached Pickens in June 1981 and began negotiating terms for
joint development. Conoco abandoned the negotiations in March 1982 be-
cause of the economic conditions then prevailing, among other reasons.
Next, Pickens commenced negotiations with Texas Tar Sands for joint
development of the Ranch, and, in June 1982, Pickens made an initial pay-
ment of $75,000 to participate in the program. According to the planned
schedule of production, initial production would begin in 1983. Due to the
extensive time required to steam heat the tar so that it would flow, however,
commercial production would not be possible until 1986. One of the essen-
tial requirements for the viable production of tar was a federal price guaran-
tee. 263 The general partner of Texas Tar Sands made four applications to
the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation from 1982 until 1985 for a price guar-
antee. Each application was denied, the last in March 1985. Shortly there-
after, all parties concerned abandoned the joint project. At the time of the
abandonment, Pickens had spent $650,000 on the project.
On June 10, 1985, .no commercial production of minerals occurred on the
Ranch and, consequently, Hope's term royalty expired. Hope asserted at
trial that Pickens breached a duty owed to Hope to produce minerals from
261. 764 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
262. For example, Conoco, Inc. suffered a total net loss of $36,700,000 for its two pilot
plants in the area, and Texas Tar Sands, Ltd. had a net loss of $12,000,000 from its nearby tar
pilot plant operations.
263. See U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act, § 134 42 U.S.C., § 8734 (1982), terminated
pursuant to Pub. L. 99-272, Title VII, Subtitle E, § 7403, 100 Stat. 144 (1986).
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the Ranch before the expiration of the term royalty. Based on a jury verdict,
the trial court rendered judgment for Hope, awarding $1,300,000 actual
damages and $500,000 exemplary damages. Pickens appealed.
According to established Texas law, the mineral fee owner owes to the
nonparticipating royalty owner a duty to exercise the executive rights to
lease or develop the minerals.2 " The standard is usually characterized as
one of good faith and utmost fair dealing.265 Pickens and Hope, however,
disagreed as to how the standard applied to Pickens. Hope contended that
Pickens owed him the duty of good faith and utmost fair dealing as mea-
sured by a fiduciary duty arising out of their relationship. This interpreta-
tion followed one of the holdings in Manges v. Guerra2 6 that found that the
relationship between the executive and the nonexecutive in that case created
a fiduciary duty on the part of the executive in exercising the executive
power. Pickens, on the other hand, claimed the duty owed to Hope was that
of an average landowner seeking to obtain all of the benefits reasonably ob-
tainable for himself and for his nonparticipating term royalty owners.
The San Antonio court of appeals analyzed the facts and holdings of
Manges v. Guerra,267 and distinguished it on its facts.268 In Manges the rela-
tionship between Manges, the holder of the executive rights in the mineral
estate, and the Guerras, the nonexecutives, was one of trust and confidence
because: (1) Manges and the Guerras were equal cotenants in the mineral
estate and this entitled the Guerras to one-half of all benefits to the mineral
estate, including bonus, delay rentals, and royalties; (2) the Guerras' assign-
ment to Manges of the executive right covering their interest in conjunction
with the partial assignment of their mineral interest created a duty and a
privilege on the part of Manges to manage the Guerras' mineral property;
and (3) in his exercise of the executive right, Manges did not extract the
same benefit for the Guerras as he did for himself, and, indeed, he commit-
ted specific acts of self-dealing that deprived the Guerras of bonus, delay
rentals, and royalties. The appellate court held that Manges does not man-
date a holding in every case that the executive owes a fiduciary duty to the
nonexecutive.2 69
Finding the facts regarding the relationship between Pickens and Hope
entirely different from those concerning the relationship between Manges
and the Guerras, the court of appeals held that Pickens and Hope did not
have a relationship of trust and confidence.270 Consequently, Pickens owed
no fiduciary duty.2 71 Instead, the court held the standard of duty the execu-
tive right owner owes to the nonexecutive equivalent to the duty to act as a
264. See Schlitler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 638, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Comm'n App. 1937,
opinion adopted); Morris v. Farst Nat. Bank, 249 S.W.2d 269, 276 (rex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
265. 764 S.W.2d at 257.
266. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
267. Ia
268. 764 S.W.2d at 266-67.
269. I4 at 267.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 267-68.
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reasonably prudent landowner who owned all of the mineral estate under the
same or similar circumstances. 272
The court held that Pickens did not breach the standard of duty owed
Hope in failing to lease the Ranch for the production of oil and gas.2 73 The
court based this holding upon the evidence that prior to the expiration of the
term royalty interest, Pickens leased the land for the production of oil and
gas, and the lessee drilled a dry hole on the premises.274
Next, the court determined whether Pickens breached the duty of good
faith and utmost fair dealing in failing to lease the Ranch to another for the
production of tar, or to develop the tar himself.27" Although evidence did
show that Pickens received three offers to lease the Ranch for the production
of tar, the court found no inference from this evidence that any of the possi-
ble lessees would have produced tar had they obtained such a lease.2 76 Nor
could the court infer production would have coniinued past the expiration of
the twenty-year term royalty.277 In Texas a lessee has no duty to produce
minerals unless the lesser can prove that such operations would yield a rea-
sonable expectation of profit to the lessee,278 The court, therefore, stated
that Pickens was under no duty to lease the Ranch for the development of
tar, because evidence showed no reasonable expectation of profit from the
production of tar.279
The court then found that Pickens had no duty to develop the tar sands
himself.280 The court held that the duty of an ordinary, prudent landowner
in the situation where the mineral owner elected to develop the minerals
himself was the same as the duty imposed upon the lessee in a lessor/lessee
relationship, that is, to act as a reasonably prudent operator.21 Finding that
the production of tar was never economically feasible during any time from
272. Id at 268-69. As more fully explained by the court:
The duty owed by the executive to the non-executive owner of a term non-
participating royalty owner requires him to timely lease the land to another for
mineral development, or to timely develop the minerals himself, if, during the
term, it becomes reasonably apparent that minerals are under the land. The
executive, in leasing the land, must act with reasonable regard for the interests
of the non-participating royalty owner as a reasonably prudent landowner who
owned all of the mineral estate would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances. Matters of cash bonus, primary term, delay rentals and special
provisions are matters of trading, and as long as the executive acts in good faith
and with reasonable regard for the interests of the non-participating royalty
owner, his judgment in leasing or refusing to lease is not subject to question, and
his refusal to lease, absent arbitrariness, connivance or deliberate action calcu-
lated to deprive the non-executive of his royalty interest, will not constitute a
breach of duty owed the owner of a non-participating royalty. The duty to de-
velop known minerals by the executive depends upon economics.
IA (emphasis omitted).





278. Id at 269-70 (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959)).
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June 10, 1965, to June 10, 1985, the appellate court held that Pickens did not
breach the duty owed to Hope.28 2
In summary, the San Antonio court of appeals held that Hope presented
no evidence that Pickens owed a fiduciary duty to Hope or that he breached
such a duty.283 Also Hope presented no evidence that Pickens breached the
duty of an ordinary, prudent landowner in failing to lease the Ranch to an-
other for the production of tar.28 4 Finally, Hope failed to prove that Pickens
breached the duty of a reasonably prudent operator in failing to produce the
tar himself.28 5 Consequently, the evidence failed to support the jury's find-
ing that Pickens breached the duty of "good faith and utmost fair dealing, by
failing to lease or develop the oil, gas or other minerals under the Chaney
Lake Ranch. ' 286 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment of
the trial court and rendered judgment that Hope take nothing in his actions
against Pickens. 28 7
Duff v. Union Texas Petroleum Co.288 involved claims for breach of a 1980
joint venture agreement between Union Texas Petroleum Corporation
(UTP) and Pluspetrol S.A. The agreement related to the submission of a
joint bid for an offshore oil and gas concession for an area known as Block
D-1, located off the coast of the Ivory Coast of Africa. According to the
terms of agreement, UTP had primary responsibility for the negotiations
with Petroci, the Ivory Coast government-owned oil company, for the award
of the Block. In the event that negotiations were successful and the Block
was awarded to UTP, the agreement gave Pluspetrol and Fluor Oil and Gas
Corporation the right to acquire from UTP a portion of the working interest.
The agreement further provided that such assignments covering Block D-1
would be subject to any required approval of Petroci or the government of
the Ivory Coast. Members of the bid group included UTP, Pluspetrol,
Rutherford Oil and Gas Corporation, and Fluor.
In 1981 the UTP bid group filed a joint bid on behalf of the bid group and
Agrip, an African-owned oil company, which joined the group at that time.
Later that year the government of the Ivory Coast notified UTP that the oil
and gas concession for Block D-1 would be exclusively divided between
UTP, Agrip, Total, a French-owned oil company, and Petroci. This alloca-
tion denied Pluspetrol, Rutherford, and Fluor any interest in the oil and gas
concession. Representatives of UTP and Pluspetrol attempted to obtain ap-
proval from the Ivory Coast government for a transfer of interest between
UTP and Pluspetrol; however, the government denied the request.
Thereafter, Pluspetrol, Rutherford, and Fluor sued UTP, claiming breach
of the joint venture agreement. Duff acquired Pluspetrol's rights under the
contract. UTP subsequently settled with Rutherford and Fluor.
282. Id. at 270-71.





288. 770 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
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Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment.
The court found that the joint venture agreement entitled Pluspetrol to as-
signment of a 1.59375% interest in the concession, that UTP failed to con-
vey that interest to Pluspetrol, and that the failure was not excused by any
act of state by the Ivory Coast government. The trial court also found that
the failure of UTP to convey the specified percentage of interest to Pluspe-
trol caused no damage or harm whatsoever to Pluspetrol or Duff. After
Pluspetrol filed the lawsuit, two wells were drilled in Block D-1, each result-
ing in a dry hole. The concession terminated shortly thereafter. The court
based the finding of no damages on evidence that Pluspetrol's interest was
not marketable and had no market value.
On appeal Duff complained that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support certain findings by the trial court. More specifically,
Duff claimed that the trial court erred in finding that the interest to which
Pluspetrol was entitled had no market value. The court, consequently, erred
in concluding that Pluspetrol suffered no damage as a result of UTP's breach
of the contract. At trial, Duff lresented evidence that before the commence-
ment of drilling, Block D-1 constituted an attractive investment opportunity
for major oil companies. Indeed, in 1982 Conoco made an offer to purchase
thirty percent of the oil and gas concession from the winning bid group for a
price in excess of $800,000 for each one percent interest. Duff, however,
failed to present any evidence of comparable sales of an interest as small as
his. UTP offered evidence explaining that since Pluspetrol's interest was so
small, no market existed for such an interest prior to production. Based on
this evidence, the appellate court concluded that Duff failed to establish the
existence of damages as a matter of law, and therefore, the court's finding of
fact controlled the issue.289
By crosspoints on appeal, UTP contended that the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it held that UTP had breached the joint venture agree-
ment because the act of state doctrine290 excused UTP's performance. UTP
claimed that when the Ivory Coast government excluded the Pluspetrol
group from participation in the concession and rejected UTP's request to
assign interest to Pluspetrol, those acts by the government excused their
breach of the joint venture agreement. The Houston court of appeals dis-
agreed, finding that the act of state doctrine inapplicable.291 The doctrine is
applicable only where one sues a foreign government or where one chal-
lenges the validity of a foreign government's expropriation of his prop-
erty.2 92 Minor involvement of a foreign government in a conflict does not
automatically invoke the act of state doctrine. 293 Having overruled all of
289. Id. at 619.
290. According to the act of state doctrine, the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory, because every
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state. Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1897); Banca Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 416 (1964).
291. 770 S.W.2d at 620.
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Taca Int'l. Airlines, 748 F.2d 965, 969-70 (5th Cir.
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Duff's points of error, and UTP's crosspoints, the appellate court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court.294
World Hospitality LtL, Inc. v. Shell Offshore, Inc. 295 required an ordering
among a supplier, a lease holder, a drilling contractor, and a lender of their
priorities of interest in the disbursement of proceeds from two wells off the
Texas coast. Nordrill, an offshore drilling contractor, operated two rigs-
the Steeler and the Gulfdrill-in the Gulf of Mexico. In 1981 Nordrill as-
signed to its lender, First City National Bank of Houston, Nordrill's income
from the Steeler. In 1984, Shell entered into a master drilling contract with
Nordrill pursuant to which the Steeler and the Gulfdrill, in 1985, began
drilling wells for Shell on its federal lease on the outer continental shelf.
World Hospitality, an offshore caterer, supplied materials and services to
feed Nordrill's offshore crews. The lawsuit involved disposition of approxi-
mately $378,000 that Shell owed to Nordrill under the master drilling con-
tract for the Steelers work. First City claimed entitlement to the funds under
its 1981 assignment of the Steeler's proceeds. World Hospitality claimed
entitlement to the money because Nordrill failed to pay World Hospitality
$90,000 for catering services in connection with the Steeler and $332,000 for
catering services provided to the crews of the Gulf drill. Shell claimed the
right to offset the amount it owed Nordrill by the amounts Nordrill owed to
its unpaid suppliers.
Threatened by the filing of liens on the drill sites, Nordrill brought suit in
Jefferson County, Texas, against World Hospitality and on June 17, 1986,
obtained an injunction preventing World Hospitality from filing liens against
Nordrill and Shell. On July 8, 1986, World Hospitality ceased supplying
goods and services to Nordrill. The injunction ultimately dissolved on Octo-
ber 20, 1986, and shortly thereafter, on November 17, 1986, World Hospital-
ity filed a lien claim with the New Orleans office of the Mineral Management
Service. Later, on March 24 and 25, 1987, World Hospitality filed lien
claims in Matagorda County and Calhoun County, Texas, respectively.
First City claimed entitlement to the funds held by Shell on the following
grounds: (1) First City's assignment of proceeds from Nordrill took prece-
dence over Shell's contract with Nordrill; (2) the objective of mineral prop-
erty liens was not security for unpaid catering services; and (3) World
Hospitality failed to timely perfect its liens against Shell's lease.
With respect to First City's claim of priority, First City asserted that its
assignment of Steeler proceeds from Nordrill was superior to Shell's right of
offset contained in its drilling contract with Nordrill. 296 According to the
court, Nordrill assigned to First City only the rights that Nordrill would
otherwise have. Nordrill had only a conditional right to the proceeds from
1984); Compania De Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, 686 F.2d 322, 325-26 (5th Cir.
1982)).
294. Id. at 621.
295. 699 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.Tex. 1988).
296. The master drilling contract and the drilling orders executed thereunder permitted
Shell to offset any payments due to Nordrill from the Steeler's work by any amounts due to an
unpaid supplier on the Gulfdrill job.
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the Steeler job; therefore, First City got the money only if Shell owed Nor-
drill on their contract. 297 Since Shell's offset against Nordrill for unpaid
suppliers on the Gulfdrill job exceeded Nordrill's entitlement under the
Steeler job, Shell did not owe Nordrill anything for the Steeler job.298 Con-
sequently, the court denied First City Center's claim to any portion of the
$378,000 based on its theory that its assignment took precedence over Shell's
contract with Nordril.299
First City next attacked the validity of World Hospitality's liens, claiming
first that statutory liens did not cover catering services and then that World
Hospital failed to timely perfect its liens. First City's rationale for this at-
tack apparently was that if World Hospitality did not have a valid lien on
Shell's property, then Shell would not be permitted to offset World Hospital-
ity's balance against the amounts it owed Nordrill. The court, however,
found catering services protected by the statutory lien.30°
Turning to First City's argument that the lien was not timely perfected,
the court noted that Texas law applies to the perfection of a lien claim on the
outer continental shelf adjacent to Texas.30' In order to perfect its lien
against Shell's lease, Texas law required World Hospitality to notify Shell
and to file a lien claim affidavit in the real property records of the nearest
county within six months following the last day it furnished labor and sup-
plies.302 Neither party disputed that the filing of lien affidavits in the Mata-
gorda County and Calhoun County records occurred more than six months
following the last date when World Hospitality supplied services. World
Hospitality, however, asserted that the injunction from the Jefferson County
court tolled the running of the filing deadline. Alternatively, World Hospi-
tality claimed that the filing of its lien claim in the Mineral Management
Service office within 180 days of the last supplies was sufficient to comply
with the filing requirement.
The court rejected the latter argument, holding that the filing of a lien
claim with the Mineral Management Service did not comply with the re-
quirement under the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act 30 3 of compliance
with adjacent state law in perfecting a lien on an owner's leasehold inter-
est.304 The court, however, agreed that the injunction prohibiting the filing
of liens against Nordrill and Shell did toll the running of the filing dead-
line.305 Deducting the effective time of the injunction, World Hospitality's
297. 699 F.Supp. 112.
298. Id
299. Id.
300. Id. at 113. The court held: "While a caterer may not have the traditional oil business
mystique of a well logger or mudman, it had men on the job site performing an essential
function. When the caterer provides victuals and personnel on the well site, its receivables
support a lien." Id.
301. Id.
302. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 56.021 (Vernon 1984); 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1988).
303. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1988) (importing adjacent-state law to determine lien's
validity).
304. 699 F. Supp. at 114.
305. Id.
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filings in Matagorda County and Calhoun County were within six months
following the date of last supply. 306
According to these holdings, World Hospitality timely perfected its liens
against Shell's leasehold. 30 7 Under the terms of the master drilling contract
between Shell and Nordrill, Shell could properly apply the proceeds that it
would otherwise owe to Nordrill for the Steelers work towards the satisfac-
tion of World Hospitality's claim for catering services provided to the Gulf-
drill and the Steeler.30° First City's only claim was to any amounts
remaining after satisfaction of Nordrill's unpaid balances to World
Hospitality. 30 9
306. Id
307. Id.
308. Id
309. Id
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